


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23 MAY 1988



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# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Soviet Union**

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**WORLD ECONOMY &  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

No 1, January 1988

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**Soviet Union**  
**WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
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JPRS-UWE-88-005

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23 MAY 1988

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### English Summary of Major Articles

18160005a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87) pp 158-159

[Text] An analysis of relations of the centres of capitalism in the 80s given in the article by V. Razmerov and Yu. Fyodorov "Two Trends of Inter-imperialist Relations" shows a complicated and dialectically contradictory interlacement of centrifugal and centripetal processes. In the economic sphere the centers of capitalism are taking shape in parallel with their growing interdependence. The high level of confrontation between the two opposing social systems explains the existence of military and political contacts among the allied Western countries. At the same time the article explains that the acceleration of centripetal trends in the West does not and cannot remove the deep economic contradictions and grave military and political divergencies. But the form of manifestation and realization of these contradictions has essentially changed as compared with the preceding historical period. Some, principally new elements have appeared in the mechanisms of smoothing economic contradictions and strict limits of their development into political collisions and conflicts have been developed. The ruling Western circles are seeking to find means for bringing down the existing level of inter-imperialist contradictions in the economy and particularly in policy through the improvement of structures, institutions, the procedures of cooperation and the regulation of the entire set of relations. The authors state that in certain cases all this abates their actions, leading to the preponderance of centripetal trends but do not by any means remove the reasons engendering such contradictions.

A. Kokoshin in the article "Military Science Development and Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments Reduction" notes that the issue of military technique and army build-up, strategy and tactics are the subject-matter of talks within social and political circles, a constituent part of the new political outlook. While considering the ways and means of armed struggle apart from social, economic and political factors attention is drawn to the objective regularities of the art of war and military technology, since the ever newer and more highly effective weapons systems are based on modern science and technology achievements. The military technosphere develops according to certain laws, the cognition of which is also highly important for the new political thinking. The article analyses the ways and means of defense and offence both in nuclear and nonnuclear spheres, examines the historical experience of armed struggle, its advantages and shortcomings which are to be appraised by history. Along with nuclear weapons build-up the race of conventional weapons continues. The author warns that conventional attacks would be similar to those of nuclear warheads and the

results would be tantamount to a nuclear attack with consequences far greater than those of the Chernobyl accident. The article states that the Warsaw Treaty member-states' defensive military doctrine signed in Berlin on May 29, 1987 as well as joint Budapest proposals and some other documents represent a package of political and military measures, reducing the danger of war in Europe, are a good example of the new political outlook on issues of war and peace.

V. Volebuyev in the article "USA: Questions of Consolidation of the New Structure of the State-Monopoly Capitalism" notes that the crisis of the US post-war system of state-monopoly capitalism has once again attracted the attention of Soviet researchers to cardinal problems of economic evolution of American imperialism. In what direction will the evolution develop? How was the increased role of the market mechanism in coordination with economic activity in the 80s linked with the development of internationalization of economic life? These are the questions posed by the author in examining the development of the SMC during the last half century. The focal point of the article is the problem of interaction of macroeconomic stabilization policies and the market system. The author emphasizes that "market renaissance" typical for the present decade and the resulting relative weakening of the state regulation were not a contingency. On the one hand, the collapse of the traditional Keynesian stabilization policy caused a certain "vacuum" on the national level regulation. On the other hand, the progressing internationalization of the American economic system in the 40s-70s led to the formation of an "opened economy". What's more, a global highly-integrated market mechanism has taken shape. Thus national macroeconomic regulation was eroded simultaneously from both sides. In analysing within the given context the Reagan strategy of transformation of SMC, the author arrives at the conclusion that its main weak point lies not in the attempt to adjust macroeconomic policy to a growing significance of market coordination, but in the continuing—despite certain party changes—underestimation of the global factors of development of contemporary SMC and correspondingly of international stabilization instruments. Unless the current Reagan strategy is corrected, its vulnerability, particularly from the external side, will keep on growing.

G. Weinstein in the article "Mass Democratic Movements in the Socio-Political Life of the West" points out that the rise of new social movements have been stipulated by some factors dealing both with socioeconomic, political and socio-psychological changes in capitalist society. These changes were not in due time taken into consideration by certain party and political institutions and as a result the enlarged, due to the growing shifts in mass mentality, "new political vacuum" turned out to be occupied by new social movements. Their Utopian outlook, satisfying the craving of the masses for new social ideals for the re-examination of old orientation of social development contributed to their activation. At

present the prospects of democratic movements depend not so much on voicing the new ideals and aims of social development as on the shaping of a new realistic and constructive programme of action. At the same time the appearance of new social forces on the arena of the socio-political struggle essentially alters the alignment of political forces, strengthening the position of democratic ones and those of social progress, widening the mass base of counteraction to conservative trends in the policy of present day capitalism.

V. Rosin in the article "Militarization of Japan: Economist's View" raises a wide range of problems touching upon the peculiarities of militarization of the Japanese economy under the present reproduction process. The article attaches great importance to correlation between economic potential and the real size of the military sector of the economy. Admitting the need for highly developed productive forces in order to build up the military might the author believes it is wrong to make no difference between economic and military-economic potentials. Japan has built up a base for the national weapons industry. It produces many classes of advanced technology? At the same time the majority of industries have not as yet been drawn into military business. Like before the National Defence Agency is purchasing some part of the most advanced armaments and technologies abroad, mainly the USA, because imports as such allow Japan to a certain degree to solve the task of arming the self-defence forces while restraining the growth of its own military business. The high level of monopolization characteristic of the Japanese economy's military sector is combined with a comparatively low volume of military production in gross shipments of firms, producing the main share of military orders. Special attention in the article is given to the impact of the present trends in the economic life on the process of militarization of the Japanese economy. It is noted that alongside with the factors heightening the economic "expediency" of a more intense transfer of firms to military production there also exist certain factors limiting militaristic aspirations inherent in the new model of economic growth. Such limiting factors include the progressive narrowing of the range of industries, covering the main demands for means and objects of labour, economic cycle's smoothing; growing importance of non-material factors in the economy and deregulation. The tracing of the limiting factors of militarization should not blur the fact that the role of the Japanese center in the correlation of military strategic forces between socialism and capitalism is undoubtedly growing.

But there does not exist a direct correlation between Japan's contribution as a powerful economic state to the two systems' military balance and the degree of militarization of its economy. The military sector's growth is far from being proportionate to that of the economic and high/tech. potential of the country.

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**Development of Military Offense, Defense Viewed**  
*AU080930 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (Signed to Press 15 Dec 88) pp 20-32*

[Article by A. Kokoshin: "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms"; boldface as published]

[Text] The new political thinking in the sphere of international relations includes an understanding of the fact that an abrupt and profound politicization of traditionally military questions—the development of military equipment and the organizational development of armed forces, strategy, and operational art, and even certain aspects of tactics—has occurred before our very eyes. These questions are the subject of talks between the highest state leaders and diplomats and of debates in public and political circles.

An analysis of the problems and prospects of arms limitation and disarmament is impossible without a revelation and full-scale consideration of the patterns of development of military affairs, primarily of a long-term nature. At the same time, disarmament problems, having become practically the most important item of international relations, are making an increasingly noticeable impact on discussions about the future armed forces of states and coalitions and about military thought. This mutual influence requires profound and intensive scientific elaboration, efforts by scientists and specialists of the most diverse vocations, and an active sharing of a new scientific discipline such as military-political research.

I

Social, economic, and political factors play a decisive role in the development of the means and methods of warfare. But the internal patterns of the evolution of military affairs proper, including military equipment, are of no small importance. The new thinking requires a full-scale consideration of the dynamics of change of various weapons systems and of the shaping of the military technosphere, which was created by man, but which is developing according to special laws still largely unknown. Knowledge of these laws is a necessity. Without this, there can be no success in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy.

The rate of development of weapons systems and—according to a number of parameters—of new methods of warfare at times significantly outstrips the rate of progress at talks on limiting armed forces and arms. The main reason for this is the lack of political will of our partners at these talks and the resistance of right-wing militaristic forces in the United States and other capitalist states. But it is also necessary to bear in mind the inadequate consideration for the logic of development of

weapons systems, the evolution of strategic and operational thought, and the lack of proper correlation between this logic and political and diplomatic logic.

One of the key problems in this process is the analysis of the dialectics of development of offensive and defensive weapons and methods both in the nuclear and nonnuclear spheres. A precise diagnosis of current offensive and defensive capabilities is necessary, as are long-term and medium-term forecasts. Such comprehensive assessments and forecasts should be based on an understanding of profound historical patterns.

F. Engels paid close attention to the competition between offensive and defensive weapons (Footnote 1) (See K. Marx and F. Engels: "Works," Vol 20, pp 176-177). It should be noted that an analysis of the dialectics of development of the offensive and defensive weapons and methods was one of the main sources of Engels' outstanding military-political predictions concerning the character and results of World War I.

The confrontation between offensive and defensive weapons has continued for millennia. It seems that one can select two historical periods to reveal the basic patterns of this process. One of them began with the appearance of nuclear weapons in 1945. The other is longer and goes back 200-220 years in history; it is associated primarily with the development of capitalism and establishment of machine production.

Phases have repeatedly changed throughout these 200-220 years, within whose framework either offense prevailed over defense or defense prevailed over offense, convincingly demonstrating the manifestation of a law of dialectics—a negation of a negation. To an ever increasing extent, these changes occurred through the development of military technology, which also entailed transformations in the methods of military operations. As Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov notes, this on no account occurred immediately after the appearance of new weapons, but only when they were used in such numbers as inevitably brought about a new qualitative status of the phenomenon. While there is a limited use of new weapons and combat equipment, they are most often adapted solely to existing methods of warfare or, at most, introduce certain partial modifications to them. For instance, machine guns were used in the 1899-1902 Boer War. However, their insignificant numbers and low quality did not lead at that time to a fundamental upheaval in the method of military operations, but only made certain changes in the combat disposition of forces. (Footnote 2) (See N.V. Ogarkov: "History Teaches Vigilance," Moscow, 1985, p 50)

The role of machine guns was more noticeable in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Thereafter, the rapid development of automatic weapons and their widespread incorporation in forces had a incomparably large impact, which was particular graphic in World War I. (Footnote 3) (Heavy machine guns sharply strengthened

defense capability, which graphically manifested itself by the middle of World War I. The mass appearance of light machine guns on the Western Front toward the end of this war noticeably strengthened the capabilities of offensive infantry. The further development of light automatic weapons made this trend even more striking by the outbreak of World War II)

Changes in the correlation of offensive and defensive capabilities, for their part, made a very considerable impact on the policies of states and on the assessments and conclusions of state and political figures and of military commands on the nature and scale of the use of military force. Actually, the scale of political goals that it was intended to accomplish by military assets largely depended on the assessment of offensive and defensive capabilities in a specific military-political situation. Historical analysis indicates that subjective assessments were often largely and even totally at variance with reality, which naturally affected the implementation of appropriate political precepts. For instance, on the eve of World War I, practically all the sides relied on large-scale offensive operations, and in most cases with most definite goals. According to the apt statement by the outstanding Russian and Soviet military theorist, A.A. Svechin, "before 1914 the entire military world fell into an offensive hysteria." (Footnote 4) (A. Svechin: "Evolution of Military Art," Moscow, 1928, Vol 2, p 577) In reality though, defense prevailed in this war.

## II

In our day, in analyzing the capabilities of offensive and defensive weapons, one most often compares World War I and II as the largest and most indicative conflicts between the most powerful agents of the system of international relations having a high level of development of productive forces. These wars were waged using all available weapons and methods of warfare with the utmost exertion of the sides' forces.

In World War I the use, in large numbers, of automatic weapons, artillery, and engineering systems, and of the forms and methods of combat operations prevailing at the time led to the fact that defense turned out to be stronger than offense. Time after time major strategic offensive operations petered out both in the Western and Eastern theaters of war in Europe. The operations of forces basically acquired a static defensive nature. (Footnote 5) (See N.V. Ogarkov, op cit, pp 48-49)

In the period between the two world wars, a number of countries actively searched for ways to overcome the situation that had arisen during World War I. At a certain point a seemingly unstable balance between offensive and defensive capabilities appeared and remained for some time, in the late twenties and early thirties.

In subsequent years, both Soviet and foreign military sciences opened up opportunities to overcome the predominance of defense over offense. (Footnote 6) (Soviet military thought developed the theory of an "operation in depth," whose modifications played an important role in the rout of Nazi Germany and its allies. The accomplishment in developing the "operation in depth" theory belongs to such prominent Soviet military theorists as M.N. Tukhachevskiy, V.K. Triandafillov, Ye.A. Shilovskiy, and A.K. Kolenkovskiy. The intention during an "operation in depth" was the simultaneous neutralization of the enemy's defense by delivery of fire to full depth, breakthrough of the tactical zone of defense in a selected sector with subsequent rapid development of tactical into operational success by engaging a breakthrough exploitation force (tanks, motorized infantry, and horse cavalry) and landing airborne assault forces to achieve the objective as quickly as possible.) Military thought in Germany was working very intensively.

From the outset, the mass utilization in World War II of breakthrough and exploitation weapons (tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, submarines, and aircraft carriers) imparted an active offensive nature to combat operations on land, in the air, and at sea. Tactical breakthrough immediately developed into operational breakthrough. Large mobile units, and primarily tank groups and armies played a decisive role in this process. (Footnote 7) (See A. Radziyevskiy: "Tank Attack," Moscow, 1977; M. Katukov: "On the Point of the Main Thrust," Moscow, 1976, pp 242-43; V. Semenov: "Brief Outline of the Development of Soviet Operational Art," Moscow, 1979, pp 199-250)

If one takes a look at history, it turns out that the Franco-Prussian War was mainly a demonstration of the superiority of offense over defense (and was the first static war in world history). If one moves even deeper into history one discovers that the Napoleonic wars were chiefly a triumph of offensive and active strategy. They were waged with definite goals aimed at routing the enemy's armed forces and at major territorial seizures. If one compares, for instance, the Seven Years' War with them, one can see that here there was no clear superiority of offense over defense; in a number of instances, defense generally prevailed over offense, and the definite goals set in the period of the Napoleonic wars were lacking.

Science, particular historical science, requires that exceptions to general patterns be revealed and considered. This is very important, because an exception in one phase of a certain process turns out to be a rule, a dominant characteristic in the next phase. Practically all of the aforesaid major wars in Europe had their very important exceptions. Napoleon, who had carried out a series of successful campaigns in Europe with the clear dominance of offense over defense, lost the war against Russia, whose military leaders, M.B. Barclay de Tolly and M.I. Kutuzov, used strategic defense as the main method of warfare against the invasion by the powerful Napoleonic army.

(Footnote 8) (M.B. Barclay de Tolly, and then M.I. Kutuzov had to defend the idea of this engagement in a sharp and constant struggle not only against Emperor Alexander I and his military advisors, but also against the view of the overwhelming majority of generals and officers of the Russian Army (including P.I. Bagration), who demanded a decisive engagement against the intruding enemy right on the Western borders of the Russian Empire, and then on the various lines of strategic withdrawal of the Russian Army. The course of events convincingly demonstrated the total correctness of Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov's strategy, despite its unpopularity among a significant section of Russian society, who did not see the harsh realities of the prevailing situation and who were guided more by their emotions than by a sober calculation of the correlations of forces and the capabilities of the Russian and Napoleonic Armies—see L. Beskrovnyy: "Russian Military Art in the 19th Century," Moscow, 1974, pp 98-105)

World War I had examples of successful strategic offensive operations: the offensive on the Russian southwestern front in July-August 1916 (the Brusilov Breakthrough) and a series of offensives by the allies on the Western Front in 1918, such as the Battle of the Marne and the Amiens and Saint-Mihiel operations.

World War II, for its part, showed that a defense prepared in advance, assuming that the tactical intentions of an enemy preparing for an attack are ascertained, is quite successful and leads to a rout of the attacker's most powerful force grouping. This was the lesson of the Battle of Kursk, one of the major battles of World War II. (Footnote 9) (For more detail see: A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov: "The Battle of Kursk in the Light of Modern Defensive Doctrine"—MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 8, 1987, pp 32-40)

In view of the general defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, the necessity and opportunities of strategic defense were clearly underestimated on the eve of the 1941 Hitlerite aggression. The possibility of defensive action was only permitted on an operational and tactical scale. (Footnote 10) (The questions of defensive operations examined at a conference of the Red Army's higher command personnel of the Red Army in December 1940 are revealing in this regard. A report on this topic was delivered by Army General I.V. Tyulenev: "The Nature of the Modern Defensive Operation." In accordance with the mission, he did not go beyond an army defense and did not explain the specifics of modern (in those times—A. Kokoshin) strategic defense. See G.K. Zhukov: "Memoirs and Thoughts," Moscow, 1969, p 190)

Considering offense as the main form of combat operations, Soviet military theory predicted that the initial period of a future war would be characterized by a large number of meeting engagements, while the belligerents'

endeavor to gain the initiative from the first hours of a war would force them to accomplish the mission by offensive operations, which would develop into meeting engagements.

At the beginning of the war, strategic defense was organized, as a rule, during the enemy's active offensive in a situation of incomplete strategic deployment and with a lack of defensive lines prepared in advance. (Footnote 11) ("The forward edge of the position almost precisely coincided with the outline of the state border, with all its bends, literally according to the slogan: 'We shall not yield an inch of our land.' This significantly increased the length of the defensive line, and created the danger of the enemy's close envelopment of our troops in the border's salients to the West. Particularly great was the danger of a deep envelopment of our quite large force groupings west of Belostok and Lvov." The enemy took full advantage of these miscalculations by us. Even such important natural lines as the main channel of the Neman River, the Avgustovskiy Canal, and the Bobr River, which were a few dozen kilometers from the border, were not used to strengthen defense, either as an obstacle in front of the forward edge or for the preparation of rear positions; (see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1965, p 28) In the summer of 1942, the unsuccessful outcome of defensive operations in the Voroshilovgrad sector and in the Donbass entailed a penetration and breakthrough on the southern side of the strategic front. This was used by the enemy to develop the offensive on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Thus, for the second time in the war, strategic defense became the main form of military operations by armed forces. (Footnote 12) (A. Maryshev: "Certain Aspects of Strategic Defense in the Great Patriotic War," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1987, p 9) [secured edition of the journal does not reveal this article] All these substantial errors led to serious defeats of the Red Army, enormous human casualties, and a considerable loss of territory.

One cannot fail to note that our postwar literature on the military art of the Great Patriotic War, right up to recent times, has mainly examined the experience of strategic offensive operations from the second half of 1943 through 1945. Often, authors have not even mentioned the fact that these operations were possible only after the initiative was seized, at the cost of enormous casualties—including through fundamental errors in the elaboration of military doctrine and strategy—from a very dangerous enemy. There is no doubt that if proper attention had been devoted to questions of strategic defense before the war, we would have paid a considerably smaller price for victory.

The origins of these miscalculations in the shaping of the Red Army's prewar doctrine go back to the late twenties, when an entire trend of military and military-political thought associated primarily with the name of Professor A.A. Svechin was virtually crushed and vilified. His works were not free of shortcomings; however, on the

basis of a comprehensive analysis of the correlations between the means of attack and protection, defense and offense, profound historical trends, the history of warfare, including World War I and its results, he made extremely important forecasts about how a second world war could begin, the nature of the threat to the USSR's western borders, and so on. (Footnote 13) (Specifically, A.A. Svechin wrote in 1927, 12 years before the outbreak of World War II: "For centuries, from the time of Richelieu, French foreign policy thought was cultivated on the creation of these conditions of fragmentation, hodgepodge, and a lack of defense capability in Europe. As a result of the operation of French policy, whose ideas developed into the Versailles 'peace' treaty, all of central Europe—Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so on—was placed under conditions that ruled out defense and a war of position.... Poland will still have the opportunity to think about how it should thank France for the gift of the Danzig corridor, which will ensure precedence for Poland regarding a German attack." A.A. Svechin: "Strategy," Moscow, 1927, p 184)

The allies also did not utilize the possibilities of strategic defense on the Western Front in May 1940. The Armed Forces of Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as Professor D. Proektor convincingly showed in his fundamental study, suffered a crushing defeat, largely because of a tragic error permitted during the deployment of the allied armies. (Footnote 14) (The Germans organized their forces into a deep penetration force, but the allies did not counter their disposition with a strategic defense with the necessary depth. The force grouping of the Hitler's armed forces had the opportunity to constantly support its striking power through reserves, which amounted to 31% of the troops. The allied forces had only 15% in reserve; they were deployed at an inadequate depth and dispersed across an extended front. As a result, the allies could not ward off the offensive or create a new stable defensive frontage; see D. Proektor: "Aggression and Catastrophe," Moscow, 1979, p 127)

One gets the impression that the allied command on the Western Front in May 1940 did precisely what Von Schlieffen, Germany's chief of general staff, dreamed of in his time and about which he wrote in his well-known work, "Cannae." (Footnote 15) ("A perfect reenactment of the Battle of Cannae is only encountered very rarely in military history, because for this one needs, on the one hand, a Hannibal, and on the other, a Terentius Varro, both of whom in their own way helped to achieve this great objective." Von Schlieffen: "Cannae," Moscow, 1938, p 350)

In examining the cyclic alternation of the prevalence of either offense or defense in major wars on the European Continent, including World War II, one cannot fail to note the presence of one stable long-term trend that seemingly permeates all these phases; namely, there was a constant increase in the kill capability of the weapons used and a growth in the intensity of combat operations

and in the depth of operations and territorial area encompassed by military events. There was also a increase in resources used for warfare and in the level of their mobilization and military-economic strain that each state experiences during a war.

### III

How has the situation since World War II developed? This has been a period of radical and unprecedented changes in the technological aspect of the task through the creation of nuclear weapons. A gigantic leap has occurred in the kill capability of weaponry. In its strategic and political significance, the appearance of nuclear weapons surpassed even the appearance of firearms. Nuclear weapons immediately, even when the sides had only a few weapons, increased even more the advantages of offense as compared with the possibilities of defense. With the growth of the number of delivery vehicles and warheads, the question of the possibility of protection against nuclear weapons became increasingly problematic, despite the expectations that appeared from time to time of creation of an ABM defense.

The assessment of the role of nuclear weapons has undergone a substantial evolution in the postwar period. N.V. Ogarkov, in particular, validly notes that in the fifties and sixties, when there were still few of them, they were viewed only as a system capable of sharply increasing the firepower of troops. Various attempts were made to adapt nuclear weapons to the forms and methods of military operations that already existed by that time, primarily to accomplish strategic tasks. Subsequently, in the seventies and eighties, the accelerated quantitative growth of nuclear weapons of various power and the development of various long-range and highly accurate vehicles for their delivery to a target as well as their wide incorporation in military forces, led to a radical review of the role of these weapons and to an abrupt change in the views on their role and importance in warfare, on the methods of conduct of a battle and of an operation, and "even on the possibility of fighting a war using nuclear weapons as a whole." (Footnote 16) (See N.V. Ogarkov, op cit, p 51)

Many assessments by Western specialists and military theorists have undergone a significant evolution. For instance, former U.S. Defense Secretary R. McNamara stresses that under modern conditions, nuclear weapons can no longer be considered as a means of waging war. (Footnote 17) (See R. McNamara: "Blundering into Disaster. Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age," New York, 1986, pp 28-35)

The appearance of these weapons, despite the revolution they have produced in military affairs, has not led to an abandonment of the development of general-purpose forces [sily obshchego naznachiniya] and conventional weapons. Moreover, many specialists stress the necessity, in peacetime, of deployed [razvernutyye] and correspondingly concentrated large general-purposes forces

equipped with conventional weapons, even, perhaps, in a larger number than required before the appearance of nuclear weapons. This was validated thus: In the event of the use of weapons of mass destruction, breakdowns in the lines of communication and in systems of mobilizing reservists are inevitable. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to make up the losses caused by a nuclear attack. Hence the conclusion that it is necessary to have, on a permanent basis, very large general-purpose forces in peacetime. As a result, at present in Europe alone, two large-scale forces in the form of NATO and the Warsaw Pact confront each other. This premise has nourished a high level of military confrontation and an arms race in nonnuclear areas as well.

Discussing the correlation of offensive and defensive weapons as applied to the nuclear period, one can briefly note the following: Let us recall, for instance, the debates in the United States in the late sixties and early seventies on the different variants of a U.S. ABM defense. At first the question of creating a dense ABM defense for the country's territory was discussed, then a "thin," dispersed ABM defense for the country's territory, and then just an ABM point defense and a system capable of protecting a proportion of American centers only from a reduced-strength strike by accidental and unauthorized launches. When the second cycle of research and development on the ABM program ended in the United States and the question arose of a spasmodic increase in appropriations for this system in connection with the upcoming deployment of one variant or another, very substantial reassessments were carried out. After fierce debates, a decision was made to virtually completely reject the creation of an ABM system. The result of these debates and corresponding military-technical and military-strategic assessments was the signing in 1972 of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty of unlimited duration.

As is known, at the turn of the seventies and eighties the idea of creating an ABM defense for the country's territory using new technology, including weapons based on new physical principles and with space-based echelons, was given new impetus in the United States and has currently become one of the main research and development programs of the Department of Defense (and of the military sector of the Department of Energy). A number of areas have already been revealed that define the potential role of this comprehensive program (the "Strategic Defense Initiative"—SDI) in the future level of the military-strategic balance.

First, we will focus attention on the program's political significance. It is aimed at undermining the ABM Treaty, which by the mid-eighties became one of the main military-political factors of strategic stability. From the military-strategic and military-technical viewpoint, the ABM system that the U.S. plans to create as a result of the realization of research and development via the SDI program could fulfill at least three functions: first, ABM defense against a reduced-strength retaliatory strike by the other side; second, the creation of a certain

capability to inflict "space-to-surface" strikes; and third, the development of a wide range of computer systems that would ensure a higher kill capability and flexibility and efficiency in using strategic offensive arms and conventional weapons and general-purpose forces. (Footnote 18) (For more detail see: "Space Weapons: A Security Dilemma," edited by Ye. Velikhov, P. Sagdeev, and A. Kokoshin, Moscow, 1986)

In examining the question of the development of the means of offense and defense in the sphere of conventional weapons and general-purpose forces since World War II, one can note another feature. Both during the war and in the postwar period, defensive weapons—antitank artillery, antitank mines, various missile and antiaircraft missile systems, antitank guided missiles, ASW ships, and so on—were created at an intensified pace. The new possibilities of these weapons were repeatedly demonstrated in local wars in the seventies and eighties. N.V. Ogarkov concludes that at a certain stage, their skillful use balanced offensive and defensive weapons. At present diverse weapons, including air weapons, against tanks, aircraft, and, to a certain extent, ships, are rapidly developing. In the process, the qualitative and quantitative development of these weapons has reached a level that urgently requires, taking into account the operation of the laws of dialectics, careful study of new trends and possible consequences of their development. (Footnote 19) (See N.V. Ogarkov: op cit, pp 48-49, 54)

Beginning with the seventies, many Soviet and Western specialists began to pay increasing attention to these circumstances. Most often, for instance, one recalls the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East, during which the belligerents lost no less than 50% of their tanks and aircraft in a matter of a few days. (Footnote 20) (Moreover, the war, begun by Egyptian President A. Sadat, was not a total war, but one that pursued limited objectives. See Ye.M. Primakov: "History of a Conspiracy (U.S. Middle East Policy in the Seventies and Early Eighties)," Moscow, 1985, pp 49-54) In the October 1973 war, tank warfare was the essence of the combat operations of both sides' forces. It showed the exceptional importance of special antitank weapons, and primarily antitank guided missiles, which were used by both ground forces and helicopter gunships. "The main trend in the development and refinement of antitank defense of the forces of the opposing sides was the enhancement of its stability and activeness." (Footnote 21) (V.P. Shipovalov: "Tank Warfare," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1986, p 77) According to the assessments of many experts, the sharply increased possibilities of infantry and the continuous development of mobile antitank guided missiles has led to the fact that the combination of tanks and fighter-bombers, which has prevailed on most battlefields since 1940, is losing the function of being a decisive tactical factor. Now it is necessary to add helicopters armed with antitank guided missiles, as well as weapons against the enemy's antitank guided missiles, to the tanks and fighter-bombers. (Footnote 22) (See

"Local Wars. History and Today," edited by I.Ye. Shavrov, Moscow, 1981, pp 161, 163) As former FRG parliamentary state secretary of defense A. von Buelow notes, modern technology makes it possible to arm an ordinary infantryman on the battlefield with relatively inexpensive weapons that can shoot down, within a matter of seconds, a very expensive aircraft or destroy a heavily armored vehicle that cost a few million. (Footnote 23) (A number of specialists in military-political problems, such as F. von Hippel (United States), A. von Mueller (FRG), A. Boserup (Denmark), R. Neild (Great Britain), S. Lodgaard (Norway), and others, have reached similar conclusions)

It seems that N.V. Ogarkov's conclusion regarding the new correlation that has appeared between the possibilities of offensive and defensive weapons should be considered in all its fullness in the elaboration of practical approaches to limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. This situation cannot remain for long, if the arms race continues, and if the nature of military-political relations between states does not change. The shift to a new stage, even a qualitative leap forward, in the development of conventional armed forces and weapons is currently imminent. Weapons are appearing that are comparable in their effectiveness with weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the sharply increased operating range of conventional weapons will make it possible immediately to closely envelop, together with border regions, a large area of the territories of countries and their coalitions, which was lacking in past wars. The qualitative leap forward in the development of conventional weapons also entails a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations. For its part, this presupposes the possibility of conducting operations using conventional weapons in qualitatively new and considerably more destructive ways than before.

The use of automated troop and weapons command and control systems, creation of worldwide reconnaissance systems and reconnaissance-strike complexes [razvedovatelnyye-udarnyye kompleksy], complete mechanization and high degree of mobility of troops, and use of military robotics bring about a transfer of an increasing number of the functions previously performed by people to automatic devices. The speed of operations and the rapid change in tactical and operational situation, simultaneous envelopment of large territories of a number of European countries, deliberate disruption of channels of communications, and conduct of combat operations at any time of day and night and under any weather conditions do not permit, as Army General V.M. Shabanov notes, political and high military leaders to authorize the decisions being made, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, because of a lack of time and information. (Footnote 24) (See V. Shabanov: "'Conventional' Warfare: New Dangers," NOVOYE VREMYA, 14 November 1986, p 8)

The shift to combat operations using weapons of mass destruction may be sudden and unpredictable, and this

engenders a desire to maintain one's nuclear weapons in a state of heightened combat readiness, which, for its part, substantially increases the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war and its escalation. The mass use of conventional weapons does not rule out a deliberate or accidental attack on the enemy's nuclear and chemical weapons, including depots, missile launchers, vehicles for storing and transporting nuclear warheads and shells, loaders, and other similar targets. Its consequences could be similar to the use of the corresponding weapons of mass destruction and could upset the balance in tactical nuclear arms and provoke unpredictable retaliatory action. Strikes by conventional weapons are also capable of destroying the numerous European nonmilitary nuclear electric power stations and power plants. The result would be virtually equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, and the consequences would be considerably more tangible than in the Chernobyl accident. (Footnote 25) (Ibid)

All this has a most negative effect on the possibility of ensuring the stability of military-strategic balance without broad measures to limit and reduce armed forces and conventional arms.

Under the present conditions, the problem of the element of surprise in combat operations so as to achieve success in offensive and defensive operations is becoming increasingly acute. The preliminary concealed activation of men, equipment, and weapons and maintaining them in constant combat readiness is a very important prerequisite for and a decisive factor in achieving success. On the whole, ensuring the element of surprise is considered a principle of military art that is as compulsory as the creation of superiority in men, equipment, and weapons in selected axes of main thrusts. (Footnote 25) (See "The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War," Moscow, 1986, pp 194-96; "The Element of Surprise in the Operations of the U.S. Armed Forces")

It is important to bear in mind that the requirements for achieving the element of surprise largely contradict conditions for ensuring strategic stability. At the same time, due to an entire package of factors, this task has become even more complicated and considerably more expensive. As compared with the period of the Great Patriotic War, the degree of troops' saturation with various weapons and military equipment has increased. Accordingly, the volume of camouflage, concealment, and deception operations necessary for the preparation of and during an operation has grown. Moreover, it is necessary to take account of the fact that reconnaissance subunits have been equipped with new technical systems, which has substantially expanded their possibilities, while complicating the conditions for operational camouflage, concealment, and deception. (Footnote 27) (See "The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operations of the Great Patriotic War," Moscow, 1986, pp 194-96)

The approaches to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons must take shape in anticipation of and with consideration for the real dynamics of development of new weapons, primarily long-range precision-guided weapons [vysokotchnoye dalnoboynoye oruzhiye]. (Footnote 28) (An analysis of the totality of various assessments of the mass appearance of these weapons in the NATO Armed Forces permits the assumption that this could happen within 5-10 years, counting from the present moment.) In many respects their appearance is capable of completely changing the traditional tenets of military art but not by any means in the direction required by the new thinking in the sphere of ensuring international security based on a recognition that it can only be mutual, just like strategic stability. Long-range precision-guided weapons, if they are adopted on a mass basis in forces, will bring additional instability. (Footnote 29) (Many serious military specialists have recently focused attention on the possibility of using a wide range of measures and weapons that would neutralize, or at least substantially reduce, the effectiveness of long-range precision-guided weapons. In particular, electronic warfare gear occupies a prominent place among them; see VOYENNYY VESTNIK, No 2, 1987, pp 83-86) Their appearance would promote the development of new warfare systems and methods and make the arms race even more expensive.

One of the urgent tasks facing military-political science today is the development of conditions for ensuring military-strategic stability in a nonnuclear world (and the stages of progress toward it) and the quest for the limits of reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities, which would be determined both on a mutual and unilateral basis.

In a number of parameters, strategic stability at the level of conventional armed forces and weapons radically differs from what should take place at the nuclear level. The basis of stability in the latter case is the threat of inevitable retribution, primarily by ensuring an unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. On the level of conventional armed forces and weapons, it is impossible to materially and practically implement a similar threat. Even if this goal were set, it would look absurd, insofar as nuclear deterrence would be replaced simply by nonnuclear deterrence, but with the same or similar catastrophic consequences.

The main thing at this level, in the context of ensuring strategic stability, is the creation of a package of conditions, in which the capabilities of defense by one side (both strategically, and operationally and tactically) would exceed the capabilities of offense by the other, and vice versa.

In elaborating the problem of ensuring a stable military-strategic balance and determining the limits of the reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities, one must bear in mind that the search for these variants of military concepts and structures of armed forces, which would be

of a clearly defensive nature, has a long tradition in Europe. Heinrich von Buelow, a prominent military affairs theorist of the 18th century, wrote: "Military art is precious to me as an aegis of security and freedom, and my duty is to study it, because I am convinced that I have ideas on how to make offense futile by improving the art of defense." Von Buelow's forerunner, Henry Lloyd, promoted the idea of natural borders in Europe that would give defense a decisive advantage over offense. (See "Warfare and Military Art in the Light of Historical Materialism," Moscow, 1927, pp 58-59)

For instance, in his fundamental work, "Strategy," published in 1911 by prominent Russian theorist General N.P. Mikhnevich pointed out the advantages of defense (both in tactics and strategy): "**Defense also has strategic advantages:** The defender is close to his resources. As he withdraws, his forces become more and more concentrated and the resources increase, while it is the opposite for the attacker.... A defender in his own country suffers less hardship than an attacker, and the mood of an army defending its own home is much more serious." For all these reasons Clausewitz considered "**defense as the strongest form of warfare.**" Commenting on this proposition of Clausewitz, A.A. Svechin wrote: "Tactically, defenders can better utilize a terrain, more widely use fortification work, and more fully exploit their fire. In strategy, defense has the opportunity to utilize the lines and depth of a theater, which forces the attacker to expend forces for the consolidation of terrain and to spend time on passage through it, while any gain of time is a new plus for defense." (Footnote 32) (A. Svechin: "Evolution of Military Art," Moscow, 1928, p 227)

Discussing the fact that defense is the stronger form of warfare, it seems that Clausewitz made an exceptionally important remark from the viewpoint of developing, on a mutual basis, approaches to strengthening strategic stability and to creating conditions for preventing a war at the level of general-purpose forces and conventional weapons: "Absolute defense is in total contradiction to the concept of warfare...." (Footnote 33) (K. von Clausewitz: "On War," Vol 2, Moscow, 1937, p 5) It follows from this view that with the shift by the two sides to purely defensive force groupings, concepts, and strategic and operational forms, the possibility of waging any large-scale war disappears. Here it is once again necessary to stress that the aforesaid applies only to general-purpose forces and conventional weapons but does not extend to the strategic nuclear sphere.

#### IV

An important step toward the creation of a qualitatively new military-political situation in Europe was taken by the Warsaw Pact states, which adopted the document, "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," at the 29 May 1987 Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee.

The proposals contained in the documents of the Budapest (June 1986) and Berlin (May 1987) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states and in the statement on the Warsaw Pact military doctrine envisage the creation of a qualitatively new military-political situation in Europe, including the mutual relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Their orientation is that reducing the levels of military confrontation on the continent would preclude the possibility of a sudden attack and the conduct of offensive operations. In other words, the main goal of these joint or parallel actions by the sides is the strengthening of strategic stability with lower and less burdensome levels of military confrontation.

Without exaggerating, this formula could be called a conceptual breakthrough in this area. The reaction in various political circles of Western Europe and among a number of personages in the United States was considerable and positive. It largely corresponds to the various concepts of so-called "alternative defense" ("nonoffensive defense," "nonprovocative defense," and so on) that have been actively developing in recent years in the FRG, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and Great Britain.

An impartial examination and comparison of the sides' military doctrines and concepts and development of a single view on the directions of their further evolution would be a substantial contribution to building confidence in Europe and enhancing the stability of the military-strategic balance. (Footnote 34) (See D.T. Yazov: "The Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine—A Doctrine of Defense of Peace and Socialism," PRAVDA, 27 July 1987)

Discussing the announcement in May 1987 of the Warsaw Pact Doctrine, Army General D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, stressed that it incorporates new views on military organizational development and on the problems of preventing a war. (Footnote 35) (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 July 1987) The prevention of war—both nuclear and conventional—has become the main task of the armed forces. This question of strategy and of military doctrine as a whole has not been previously studied to this extent. Within the framework of general defensive orientation of military doctrines, the question arises of a total correspondence between its political and military-technical components. In this connection, Soviet military leaders stress that the provisions of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine are a mandatory part of the military art and organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the other allied armies. As Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, deputy chief of General Staff, stresses, the Soviet Army's main mode of operation in repulsing an aggression will be not offensive, but defensive operations and combat action. It seems that the latter very important provisions of the military-technical part of the USSR's and Warsaw Pact's

military doctrine could serve, to a certain extent, as a reply to the question, frequently raised in the West, of Soviet "operational maneuver groups."

At the same time, one cannot fail to note that the Warsaw Pact countries have every reason to have a negative attitude toward the NATO concept of a "Follow-on Forces Attack" [udar po vtoromy echelonu], which essentially repeats the openly offensive American concept of "Airland Operation (Battle)." The current U.S. naval strategy, which is associated with the names of Admiral Watkins and former U.S. Navy Secretary Lehman, is of an obviously aggressive and dangerous (ultimately for both sides) nature.

Such U.S. and NATO strategic and operational concepts are completely incompatible with statements about the defensive nature of the NATO doctrine. It is noteworthy that this is recognized by many political figures and military professionals in the West, who criticize such concepts in view of their inability to ensure mutual security and strategic stability.

A frank discussion of both sides' military doctrines and concepts, and the development of a common approach to the question of the directions of their further development, is a very complex and largely unprecedented task. But the nature of the threat facing Europe and the whole of civilization in the event of the outbreak of war is also unprecedented.

It seems that it will be necessary to conduct an assessment of the combined combat capabilities of the sides as it applies both to defensive and offensive tasks to successfully solve the problem of preventing a sudden attack. In a number of parameters, this will require more complex layouts and studies than a quantitative comparison of the opposing forces in the traditional vein—comparing the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces, missile launchers, and so on. It is necessary to bear in mind that there are currently considerable differences in the assessments of composition of men, equipment, and weapons of the sides (Warsaw Pact and NATO) in official Western and Soviet publications (Footnote 36) (See "Disarmament and Security, 1986," Annual of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Vol 1, Moscow, 1987, p 220), which, moreover reflect different methods of calculation. Questions associated with the elaboration of "third generation" confidence-building measures (if one takes what was adopted at the Stockholm conference in 1986 as the second generation) will require more in-depth professional preparation. Among other things, a special analysis of the role of current exercises (particularly combined-arms exercises) in the combat training of the sides' armed forces seems necessary.

Despite the problems that arise in connection with prospects for joint measures to strengthen strategic stability and to reduce the levels of military confrontation,

it is precisely this approach that is most promising. It is substantially different from the one that has been used for many years at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe.

At present the conditions for the verification [proverka] of accords substantially surpass those that existed 30-40 years ago. This very fact alone testifies to the possibility of ensuring stability in a nonnuclear world and of enhancing the stability of military-strategic balance at various levels of nuclear arsenal reductions. Strategic stability at reduced levels of military confrontation could be achieved through the creation by each side of expressly defensive forces and structures armed with the appropriate weapons, which could not be used for a sudden attack in the interests of offensive operations. The destabilizing types of conventional weapons must be limited and prohibited.

The entire structure of the sides' men, equipment, and weapons, and of surveillance and command, control, and communications systems must be such that in the event of an outbreak of an armed conflict, it would not promote its escalation and would provide an opportunity for the supreme political leadership and military command to receive at any moment adequate information about the development of the conflict and to control it for the purposes of terminating it at the earliest possible stage.

One of the main principles of creating an essentially new system of military-strategic balance at the level of general-purpose forces and convention weapons boils down to the following: The Warsaw Pact's defensive capabilities must substantially exceed NATO's offensive capabilities, while NATO's defensive capabilities must substantially exceed the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities, at reduced levels of military confrontation between the two alliances. It is precisely this that the proposals of the Budapest (1986) and Berlin (May 1987) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states lead to. Success in this task would largely contribute to the creation of the necessary mutual security conditions for the switch to a nuclear-free world.

#### **Left's Failure To Coopt Social Protest Movements Bemoaned**

*18160005b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87) pp 46-56*

[Article by G. Vaynshteyn: "Mass Democratic Movements and the Social and Political Life of the West"]

[Text] A distinguishing feature of the modern era is the growth of the role of the people's masses in social development. Increasingly broad strata of the population of various countries are joining the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress. This trend is being

expressed distinctly in the stimulation of mass democratic movements, which have become an important factor of the social and political life of many capitalist states.

In Soviet and foreign literature these movements are often called new social movements. And such a definition is perfectly legitimate. True, there were demonstrations by peace supporters and fighters for civil rights and also the rights of women and national minorities earlier also. But the majority of today's democratic movements are of a qualitatively different nature. They differ from the previous ones not only in their incomparably greater assertiveness, scale of activity and purposefulness in defense of the demands which they are putting forward but also in the fundamentally new tasks which they are setting themselves.

#### **Reasons for the Stimulation**

The upsurge of the new social movements has been brought about by a set of factors. One such is the growth of crisis processes and phenomena in various spheres of the life of contemporary bourgeois society. Endeavoring to achieve a stabilization of its positions, the ruling class launched an offensive against the working people's socioeconomic gains and their democratic rights and liberties.

Another factor having a direct impact on the domestic political situation in many developed capitalist countries is the growing threat of nuclear war and ecological catastrophe born of the policy of the West's militarist circles aimed at a spiraling of the arms race and the spurring of international tension and also the selfish policy of the monopolies, which in the race for profits frequently disregard elementary nature-conservation measures.

All this is objectively leading to an exacerbation of the contradictions of capitalist society and bringing about a growth of mass discontent and protest and an increase in social assertiveness, which is partially finding an outlet in the channel of the democratic movements.

At the same time it would be an oversimplification to see the upsurge thereof merely as a reaction to present-day socioeconomic and political problems or as a "response" to the offensive of the conservative forces. These movements are now developing on a considerably broader motivational basis. The extensive range which has been acquired by, for example, the movements of peace supporters and ecologists or fighters for civil rights is explained not only by the objective state of the problems which they are advancing but also the perception thereof, which has become considerably more intense than in the recent past (1). Behind this change are profound shifts in the mass consciousness and mentality of bourgeois society connected with the formation of new requirements, values and social ideals.

It is indicative that the majority of the present mass democratic movements (youth, peace, ecological, feminist, for civil rights and a number of others) appeared in the social and political arena or made their presence felt at full volume back at the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's, that is, in a period of the development of capitalism which was comparatively propitious economically. And this was not, of course, fortuitous.

In this case we are dealing with a "fact of the biography" not so much of the mass democratic movements themselves as of contemporary bourgeois society. It is customary to believe that the present stage of the crisis of capitalism began in the middle of the last decade. And this is true if one is referring to the abrupt disturbance of the stability of the economic structures which occurred at that time, the profound changes in the conditions of capitalist reproduction and the changes in the position of the masses connected therewith. However, the crisis processes which encompassed the socioeconomic sphere as of the latter half of the 1970's were just one (although the most obvious, possibly) piece of evidence of capitalism's embarkation upon a new stage of its development. It had been preceded by a growth of political instability and an intensification of the conflict between "civil" and "political" society which had been showing through at the end of the 1960's. Distinct signs of a spiritual crisis of bourgeois society, which was expressed in the growing disenchantment of the representatives of various social strata with the customary standards and values of the bourgeois lifestyle reducing the meaning of man's existence to satisfaction of elementary material requirements, appeared in this same period.

The erosion of the mentality of consumerism and technocratic rationalism which had been intensively introduced to the mass consciousness by the entire atmosphere of postwar capitalism, the increasing aspiration in the most diverse strata of the population to a different, more meaningful, spiritually full life, the growth of the role of humanitarian values and ideals—such was the thrust of the changes which showed through in the social consciousness on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's.

For a number of reasons (higher level of education, particular sensitivity to moral and ethical and humanitarian aspects of life) the student youth was the first to express the changes in the socio-psychological climate of the capitalist countries, having with its innate emotion and lack of compromise openly challenged the values of the "consumer society". It was the radical left students who were the prophets of a number of the present democratic movements, and it was in the course of their protests that the new trends in the development of the mass consciousness acquired an outlet onto the surface of social and political life. Despite the subsequent decline in the student protest movement, the new values which they had expressed acquired magnetic force for millions of people, becoming in time a factor determining to a considerable extent the world perception and behavior of broad masses of the population of capitalist countries of the West.

Of course, the establishment in the social consciousness of new requirements, ideals and values is not merely the result of the impact of the protests of rebellious student youth or the criticism of bourgeois society on the part of the "New Left". An appreciable part in the evolution of the mass consciousness has been played by the changes which have been occurring in recent decades in the social experience, tenor of life and intellectual character of the masses themselves. Particular significance is attached to the growth of the educational and cultural level of broad strata of the population, which on the one hand entails their increased capacity for an independent comprehension of surrounding reality and their position in society free of the influence of predominant ideological tenets and, on the other, contributes to a change in the content of their requirements and a complication of the structure of social needs. Certain democratic and social gains achieved by the working people in the postwar decades strengthened in many of them feelings of their own worth, impatience with attitudes of social dependence and a resolve to seek satisfaction of their cherished aspirations.

Under these conditions the social protest growing under the impact of the crisis phenomena in various walks of life no longer fits within the framework of conventional reformist policy, and increasingly broad strata of the population of capitalist countries aspire to the direct expression of their interests. The political stimulation of millions of people in the West and qualitative changes in the nature of the demands they are putting forward testify to the formation of a new political culture assigning priority to the solution of such problems as assurance of the rights of the individual and the citizens' democratic participation in the political process, prevention of thermonuclear catastrophe and preservation of the environment.

An analysis of the factors which have contributed to the stimulation of the new social movements and their conversion into an independent political force would be incomplete without consideration of the fact that the establishment in the structure of the mass consciousness of nonconformist, democratic sentiments and nonmaterial requirements and demands led to the emergence in capitalist society of a kind of "political space," the need for the filling of which was not opportunely recognized by the main political parties, which concentrated their attention on the confrontation in the sphere of "traditional" socioeconomic problems.

True, there were also a number of "objective" factors preventing the integration by the evolved political institutions of the exponents of the new social orientations. First, it was the policy of the bourgeois and reformist parties operating within the framework of these institutions which broad social strata saw (and continue to see) as the source of many negative trends in the social life and domestic and foreign policy of their countries.

Second, increasingly large numbers of the masses perceived the traditional political institutions of bourgeois society as a force preventing realization of their increased need for democratic participation.

A characteristic feature of the new mood, which became increasingly prevalent, was not only anger at state-monopoly centralization, the bureaucratization of various walks of life and the suppression of the personality but also a disbelief in the efficiency of the functioning of the existing forms of parliamentary democracy. The radicalization of democratic tendencies entailed a nonacceptance of the traditional party formations and an aspiration to "direct" expression independent of them and to "base democracy".

On the other hand, the traditional parties themselves—both bourgeois and reformist—evidently underestimated the significance of the new demands of an international political, ecological and spiritual and moral order taking shape in the social consciousness and the disillusionment of part of these parties' electorate with the particularly materialist goals of social development which they were proclaiming. Whence also their underestimation of the role and prospects of the new social movements expressing the changed requirements of the masses. These movements, highly heterogeneous in terms of their ideological and political character and the slogans they advanced and social and age composition, were initially perceived by the traditional parties as a temporary, transient phenomenon.

A certain lagging in recognition of the changes which had taken place in society and in the mentality of the masses was allowed to occur by the forces of the left also, including the communists. Spokesmen for a number of communist parties point plainly to this fact today as an important factor by virtue of which the depreciation of bourgeois values which had been growing as of the start of the 1970's and the masses' increased discontent with a number of aspects of capitalist reality and their aspiration to social change did not lead to an expansion of the communists' mass influence.

Not everything here, naturally, depended and now depends on the forces of the left themselves. We cannot disregard, specifically, the powerful ideological impact on the masses of the bourgeois propaganda media actively, and not unsuccessfully, implanting in the social consciousness cliches of anticommunism. A role of considerable importance has been performed also by the fact that the profound disenchantment with the parties as a traditional social institution and the endeavor to dissociate from them have frequently extended to the communist parties also, which have been seen as a component of the existing political system.

Granted all this, the communists themselves have far from always been prepared to respond opportunely to certain questions which have arisen in the course of the development of capitalist society. As A. Magnin, general

secretary of the Swiss Labor Party, for example, observed, "at the moment of origin of the nontraditional movements we failed to see the prospect which had been revealed to us and failed to perceive them as serious partners. We are now having to make good what was let slip." No less self-critical is J. Jensen, chairman of the Danish Communist Party: "The original experience of the new social movements has shown that we have not always succeeded in latching on in good time to all that is new that is born of life and the creativity of the masses and going beyond the framework of traditional demands and habitual forms of struggle. We have sometimes occupied too much of a wait-and-see position, as a result of which the initiative has been lost in places and opportunities for winning potential allies of the proletariat from the middle strata have been let slip" (2).

Under current conditions the new social movements have become the force which has been able to fill the political vacuum, as it were, which came about as a result of the departure of part of the population of Western countries from the traditional parties. It has been within the framework of these movements that an opportunity has been gained to a considerable extent for realization of the political potentialities connected with the aspiration of the broad masses to a search for new social ideals and also an intensification of their direct impact on the political process.

#### From Separateness to Interaction

In the comparatively brief period of its existence the mass democratic protest movement has enjoyed an appreciable evolution. The forms of struggle have changed and the range of tasks which various detachments of the movement are setting themselves has expanded. There is a growing understanding in the ranks of their participants of the fact that the confinement of activity to the defense of narrow, specific demands connected with the solution of problems of day-to-day life (ecological, housing and such) on a local scale leads to a scattering of forces and, consequently, to the reduced efficiency of the struggle. Whence the endeavor to overcome the disconnection among the numerous groups and associations pursuing identical or similar ends ("community action," mutual assistance and "civic initiative" groups and so forth).

Of course, questions of a local nature are, as before, a principal factor prompting people to join this movement or the other. Thus considerable numbers of the participants in the ecology movement are made up of persons protesting against industrial facilities, hydraulic structures and transport arteries representing a threat to the environment primarily within the confines of a certain locality. At the same time certain protest actions undertaken by defenders of the environment for a specific reason are increasingly often shedding their purely local significance and being inscribed in the context of general democratic struggle.

The expansion of the range of tasks being promoted by the participants in the mass democratic movement is creating an objective basis for the convergence and intermingling of its individual detachments. It is now becoming increasingly difficult to draw "demarcation" lines precisely delineating the spheres of their activity. The differentiation of the mass democratic movement into individual components is becoming conditional to a certain extent inasmuch as the activists of some detachments of this movement are often simultaneously participants in others.

And this is natural. The very logic of the struggle is confronting various movements with new problems without whose solution, as an increasingly large number of their participants understands, the demands which have determined the basic thrust of the activity of a given movement cannot be satisfied. Take, for example, the experiments involving the creation of self-help groups and the formulation of cooperative methods of running a business. A search for new forms of the organization of labor may be traced in them increasingly distinctly as of the 1970's. The movements which emerged as the result of dissatisfaction with the specific conditions of day-to-day existence are another example. With the growth of the critical attitude toward existing practices on the part of these movements they have been attempting with increasing persistence to find an "alternative lifestyle". The movement in defense of the environment long since passed beyond the framework of purely ecological demands and deals in its activity with the entire set of questions connected with the development of civilization under the conditions of the current stage of S&T progress. It was the ecologists who attracted the attention of the international community to its negative consequences and the threat to the environment which had arisen. The struggle against environmental pollution and for the conservation of nature and the diversity of existing life forms is most closely connected with removal of the threat of global catastrophe in the event of thermonuclear war. The defenders of the environment's clear understanding of this connection is leading to the suffusion of the ecology program with an antiwar content and a broadening of the front of struggle: in the course thereof purely ecological slogans are being interwoven with demands for a halt to the production and testing of nuclear weapons and the elimination of the stockpiles of weapons of mass annihilation. In turn, the antinuclear thrust of the "green" movement is attracting to its ranks opponents of the arms race and the aggressive policy of imperialism.

The need to go beyond the framework of the original aims distinguishes other movements also. Thus activists of the feminist movement are by no means confining themselves to demonstrations for the achievement of equal rights for women, and many of them are participating in protest campaigns organized by the ecologists and also in antiwar actions. Peace supporters are broadly represented in the movements in defense of the environment and against the violation of the civil rights of women and national minorities.

Such close interweaving of the various components of the mass social protest movement is being achieved thanks to the fact that their participants share largely similar values and the identical democratic, humanitarian aspirations and ideals inherent in the broad masses.

A characteristic feature of the development of the mass social protest movement at the current stage is its growing politicization and the increasingly distinct recognition by the participants in various detachments of the movement that the achievement of the demands which they are putting forward is impossible without political struggle. The endeavor to exert a direct influence on the political process is being expressed in the creation on the basis of the ecology movement of particular parties, which have in a number of countries become a highly influential political force. The ecologists' parties are now represented in local and central authorities in the FRG (where they have scored the greatest success), Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Finland and certain other West European states.

#### Between Utopia and Reality

While calling the attention of the community of Western countries to various problems being encountered by capitalist society and also global problems common to all mankind the ideologists of the mass democratic movements far from always have a clear idea of the ways and methods of their solution. In a number of cases the demands put forward by these movements reflect to a far greater extent unhappiness with the existing situation and a nonacceptance of reality than testify to the presence of positive alternatives. Many experts note such a feature of the social world view of the participants in the new social movements as utopianism. It is characteristic of the principles of the majority of them to this extent or the other.

Traits of utopianism may be traced, for example, in the negative attitude characteristic of certain movements (the "civic initiatives" movement primarily) toward the state as such and in the attempts to counterpose to the callousness and bureaucratism of state-monopoly centralism and major institutions organizations free of all fetters constructed on democratic principles. "Base democracy" is portrayed by the ideologists of these movements as the sole correct form of organization and as the most adequate method of revelation of the creative initiative of the masses and the realization of their social assertiveness.

Even more utopian is the social ideal inspiring the participants in the "alternative projects". It is no accident that the lifestyle in communes which they propagandize with its inherent extremes of the "simple life" and the endeavor to fence themselves off from modern civilization completely and go "back to nature" shocks the masses or is perceived as being eccentricity, at least.

An imprint of utopianism is borne also by the antience, anti-industrial tenets of the ecologists, who are attempting to find harmony with nature by way of a renunciation of S&T progress and modern industry. The same may be said about the idea of a "third way" proclaimed by the participants in some other movements, which they regard as an alternative to both capitalism and socialism, or about the ideas according to which the future revolution in the "abundant society" will occur on the basis of a "revolution of values".

But while noting the utopian character of the social ideals and paths of social development proclaimed by the mass democratic movements it would hardly be correct to see this merely as evidence of their weakness and insufficient maturity. The utopianism of the present-day protest movements is simultaneously a source of their strength also: it ensures the attractiveness of these movements in the eyes of broad social strata and thereby contributes to a growth of their influence.

Utopia is frequently seen merely as a kind of synonym for untenability and fantasy. However, the content of this concept is considerably broader. Utopia represents a specific type of prescientific consciousness and a form of critical comprehension of objective reality by masses unversed in the scientific methodology of social analysis. And as such it has a capacity for performing a mobilizing function and acting as the stimulator of social assertiveness under the conditions of the broad masses' nonacceptance of existing reality and thirst for new ideals. Owing to the certain ideological underdevelopment and inner contradictoriness of the social consciousness, utopias, as prescientific concepts of social changes within whose framework "the subjective is not separated (and cannot be separated) from the objective, the law-governed, from the valuational, the rational, from the emotional, and the imagined, from the real" (3), are in keeping with the masses' aspiration to radical alternatives.

Particular significance is attached to this attractiveness of utopian social ideals in periods of history when the existing forms of social development are in a state of crisis and when the masses are urgently aware of the need for a cardinal change in reality and its incompatibility with their interests and cherished aspirations. Under these conditions utopianism, as a way of thinking, moves from the periphery of the social consciousness to the forefront and becomes a natural feature of the world perception of very significant numbers of the population. Increasingly active utopian thought proves to be a kind of spokesman for the focus of the search of the mass consciousness. "If the conventional dream," the well-known American expert F. Manuel observed, "frequently reflects unsatisfied requirements or suppressed and transformed desires, utopia may be a sensitive indicator of what the most agonizing problems of the era are" (4).

The receptivity of various strata of the population of Western countries to the utopian projects of social change being put forward by a number of movements is also explained by the fact that these projects satisfy the need of significant numbers of the masses for the elaboration of an ideal picture of the world wherein the boundaries between dream and reality are effaced and in which their longings are most fully expressed. This need represents, to judge by everything, an important component in the structure of the social consciousness, which is preserved, despite the manifest strengthening therein of the rational principle as a result of the growth of the educational level and the role of scientific knowledge. And here is obviously a paradox of the contemporary social world perception: increased attention to questions of the practical realization of a variety of projects of social rearrangement and their feasibility is oddly combined therein with an aspiration to social ideals unfettered by rationalist considerations and guided merely by the imperative of the desired.

At the same time, evidently, the strengthening of the utopian principle in the mass consciousness of bourgeois society should not be seen merely as evidence of the need preserved in various strata thereof "to fly away into the realm of pure fantasy" (5). It is also an indication that significant numbers of the population of capitalist countries of the West are no longer confined in their attitude toward reality to a position of passive contemplativeness, which is characterized by a perception of the existing order of things as, if not the sole correct and intelligent, then, at least, the sole possible. And in this sense the utopianism of the contemporary concepts of social change reflects positive trends in the evolution of the social consciousness. As the Soviet expert E. Batalov writes, "to the extent that the ruling classes of modern capitalist society aspire to educate the masses in a spirit of 'realistic' conformism for the purpose of preservation of the sociopolitical 'status quo,' to that extent a utopian consciousness and the utopias developing in the channel of the mass protest movement may perform at the present stage of the antimonopoly and anti-imperialist struggle a certain positive role" (6).

In speaking of the utopianism of the contemporary projects of social rearrangement mention has to be made of the essential differences between them and the utopias of the past. All preceding generations of representatives of utopian thought attempted to counterpose to the reality surrounding them a picture of the desired world specified virtually down to the tiniest details. The modern utopias, on the other hand, are characterized not so much by the elaboration of static details of the new harmonic society as a search for new principles of its functioning.

Naturally, the system of utopian thinking characteristic of the thinkers of preceding eras is frequently reproduced on this path also. Specifically, the antitechnicist, anti-industrial ideas of the ecologists extol, like many utopias of the past, a "paradise lost," seeing as their ideal the

"golden age" of pre-industrial relations. Nonetheless, a distinguishing feature of present-day utopianism is primarily the endeavor to find a new paradigm of social development. It is this which is a most important political function of the mass democratic movements. As a Western study observes, "the new social movements are participating most actively in the redesigning of social relations. They are having a profound impact on all of society, an impact which cannot be evaluated from the viewpoint of successes or failures..." (7).

At the same time it also has to be seen that the utopianism of the contemporary democratic movements which contributed at the original stage of the development of these movements to their formation as an independent political force and the strengthening of their positions is with time increasingly coming into conflict with their political pretensions. The prospects of these movements now are being determined to a growing extent by a capacity not only for propagandizing new social ideals, a new world view and a new approach to the goals of social development but for achieving the political "filling" of these ideals. That is, the very logic of political struggle is confronting the movements with the need to formulate a practicable, constructive action program and alternative social development paths.

As the democratic movements acquire experience, there is a growing understanding on their part also of the complexity of the problems confronting capitalist society. Indicative in this respect is the position of the Greens in the FRG: "People in West Germany are threatened today by the ecological and economic crisis of industrial society" (8). This evaluation of objectively existing socioeconomic reality requires solution of the extraordinarily complex fundamental question of the possibilities and methods of the combination of ecological and economic values and goals. There are other questions also: what are the means of realizing some (including those which are unpopular in a certain milieu) measures proposed by ecological policy; how will the implementation of such measures affect the socioeconomic situation and, ultimately, the social and political mood of the masses?

It is not fortuitous that the movement of defenders of the environment has recently been attempting increasingly actively to draw up alternative economic programs which proceed from the need to combine purely economic goals and the tasks of preserving and extending employment. The creation within the framework of the "green" movement of such research groups as "Ecologists for Full Employment" (United States), which are guided in their activity by the fact that any real alliance between the working class and the ecologists must be based on their common preoccupation with the employment problem (9), calls attention to itself, for example.

#### The Mass Movement and Traditional Policy

The exceptional complexity of developing a practicable alternative to existing reality convincing to broad strata of the population objectively puts the ecology movement

and the parties representing it in a difficult position. The practice of recent years attests the difficulties which they encounter in attempts to broaden their mass base, more, the possibility of a narrowing thereof. A period is arriving, to judge by everything, in the development of the ecology and other new social movements when the question of whether their upsurge proves merely an episode or they become a long-term factor of the political life of present-day capitalism will depend increasingly on the actual content of their programs. The need for the specification of the alternative projects is not only complicating the activity of a number of social protest movements but also creating a certain danger of a change in their proclaimed ideals and loss of "character" as a result of the "grinding" of the movements by the actual practice of political struggle.

The historical experience of a number of mass democratic movements of the recent past confirms the possibility of their absorption by the traditional political system. The existing party-political structures have a significant reserve of integration capabilities. And they frequently succeed in emasculating the radical nature of the opposition tenets of the mass protest movements, incorporating them in the customary process of political rivalry (having introduced them to the generally accepted "rules of the game") and converting them into distinctive institutionalized pressure groups operating by the methods traditional for the bourgeois political system.

The change (compared with the 1960's-start of the 1970's) in the methods of struggle for their rights of the negro population of the United States may, in particular, serve as an example of such a transformation. Certain signs of political integration are noticeable also in the activity of the West German Green Party. On the one hand ever increasing authority and influence therein are being acquired by the so-called "realistic" or "pragmatic" wing opposed to the "fundamentalists" (who maintain their devotion to the principles of pure ecologism and anti-industrialism). In the opinion of some experts, the endeavor of the "pragmatists" to bring ecological ideals closer to actual reality is fraught with a change in the nature of this party and its conversion into a junior partner of the SPD and, ultimately, one further party of the establishment, which seeks methods of stabilizing the existing system (10). On the other, the evolution of the Green Party which is under way could bring about the disenchantment therewith of the part of the voters which in the past left the social democrats and lead to a reduction in its electorate.

But whereas for the mass protest movements themselves incorporation in the political process is at the present stage more a factor of their potential change, for the traditional party institutions and the bourgeois state the stimulation of the democratic movements and the expansion of their social base have already raised a number of perfectly real and complex problems. The

aspiration of these parties, reformist and bourgeois primarily, to win back the "political space" which they lost is forcing them to make changes to their program principles and activity and to shift accents in the political struggle.

Antiwar and ecological problems and questions of an improvement in the quality of life are becoming an indispensable attribute of the program demands of many parties. Of course, purely opportunist, pragmatic considerations connected with hopes that the inclusion in the parties' programs of popular slogans will secure an increase in their vote at elections may frequently be discerned behind such changes. But whatever the case, appreciable changes are occurring in the positions of a number of traditional parties under the influence of the demands being advanced by the new social movements. Thus the protest movements are not only having a direct impact on the political process and involving the masses in new forms of participation in social and political life but also contributing to other parties' addressing the new problems of society and the requirements of its various strata. With the conversion of the new social movements into an influential and independent political force the ruling class is being confronted increasingly seriously with the need to satisfy entirely new requirements of the masses—requirements of a qualitative, humanitarian and democratic nature. The advancement and increasingly assertive expression of democratic demands and the shaping of requirements pertaining to an improvement in qualitative aspects of life are leading to the appearance of new "fronts of confrontation" between the ruling class and the masses. Granted all the contradiction of the political practice of the mass democratic movements, their activity is affecting a number of highly vulnerable "sore points" of contemporary bourgeois society which have "slipped" from the field of vision of the traditional parties of the left or which are on the periphery of their interests. Thus the sociopolitical conflicts in the capitalist world are acquiring a new dimension, and the mass base of opposition to the policy of the ruling class is expanding.

All this is creating the prerequisites for the conversion of the new social movements into a long-term factor of the political life of capitalism. The concessions which they are wresting from the ruling class are not, as a whole, leading to a lessening of the intensity of the democratic struggle of the masses. While satisfying certain (antiwar, ecological, democratic) demands of the mass movements the establishment is nonetheless proving not to be in a position to prevent the continued development of the demonstrations of broad social strata against reactionary trends in policy and in support of the democratization of society.

Naturally, the prospects of the forces of democracy and social progress will depend to a tremendous extent on the solution of the complex problem of the relations of the mass democratic movements and the parties of the left, including the communist party. As distinct from other

party-political organizations, the majority of communist parties see the new social movements not as a rival in the struggle for the masses but an ally in defense of these masses' broad demands.

This approach of the communist parties to the new social movements by no means downplays the depth of the disagreements (ideological primarily) which exist between them. However, without glossing over the world-outlook differences with the general democratic movements, the communists are putting the emphasis on the community of interests in the struggle against the reactionary, militarist trends in the policy of the ruling class. Proceeding from the need for joint action, they are seeking ways of organizing mutual cooperation on a progressive and democratic basis and the stimulation of their participation in new forms of struggle against the military threat, in defense of the environment and for a broadening of the social and civil rights of women, the youth and representatives of national minorities (11).

However, the specifics of the mass base of the democratic movements and the singularities of their ideological character not only create quite considerable difficulties in the way of the establishment of strong ties between the antimonopoly, anti-imperialist forces but pose anew the problem of the leading role in the alliance of these forces. Experience shows that nonparty protest movements perceive extraordinarily painfully any attempts to limit their autonomy and their ideological and organizational independence (which, incidentally, is complicating cooperation between the movements themselves also). The attractiveness of the mass democratic movements is frequently determined precisely by their aloofness from all "systemic" organizations and also the absence therein of ideological unity and integral, consistent ideological tenets. The increased complexity of relations between social psychology and ideology brought about by the intensification of the intrinsic contradictoriness of the consciousness of the masses is reflected in a kind of hostility of the supporters of the new social movements in respect of clear-cut ideology and an aspiration to preserve the world-outlook variegation of these movements as a prerequisite of an expansion of their mass base.

The ideological pluralism of the democratic movements is perceived by their participants themselves not as a shortcoming but rather as a sign of strength. The majority of activists of these organizations see the domination of a particular ideology as a factor capable of leading to their loss of mass support (12). Under these conditions particular significance is attached to the capacity of the workers movement and its class organizations for cogent and patient dialogue with the participant, in the new social movements, in the course of which scrupulousness in defense of one's own positions must be combined with patience and respect for the views of one's potential allies.

At the same time the politicization of the mass democratic movements which has been occurring recently is forcing them to adopt a more clear-cut position in the ideological delineation of the social and political forces of contemporary capitalism. The global nature of the problems stimulating the upsurge of the mass democratic movements is objectively contributing to their movement toward a new level of struggle, which requires not only the unification of the efforts of all democratic forces in countering the negative trends of social development but also more scrupulous ideological opposition to the conservative and reactionary policy of capitalism. The very logic of the struggle creates the prerequisites for the growth of the ideological maturity of the participants in the democratic social movements and their increased receptivity to the genuinely scientific ideology of social progress.

#### Footnotes

1. It is significant that in the course of a survey conducted at the start of the 1980's in the United States 72 percent of those polled, speaking of the reasons for the sharp increase in the political significance of ecological problems, cited as the main one not the objective state of the natural environment but the change in the nature of the requirements and value orientations of the population (PUBLIC OPINION, Feb/Mar 1983, p 47).
2. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 11, 1983, p 39; No 4, 1985, p 21.
3. Z. Faynburg, "On the Question of the Content of the Concept of Utopia in the System of Contemporary Philosophical and Sociological Knowledge" (SBORNIK NAUCHNYKH TRUDOV No 59, Perm, 1971, p 88).
4. See F. Manuel, "Freedom from History and Other Untimely Essays," London-New York, 1972, p 117.
5. See K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," vol 19, p 194.
6. VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 10, 1973, p 94.
7. See "Neue soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA. Ein internationaler Vergleich," K.-W. Brand (Publ.), Frankfurt/Main, 1985, p 332.
8. NEW LEFT REVIEW, Jul/Aug 1985, p 15.
9. THE NATION, 9 October 1982, p 331.
10. ALTERNATIVES, April 1986, p 250.
11. For more detail see "The International Workers Movement. Questions of History and Theory," vol 8, Moscow, 1985; Yu. Krasin, B. Leybzon, "Communists and the New Social Protest Movements" (KOM-MUNIST No 5, 1984, pp 105-115); V.V. Glinchikov,

"Communists and the New Social Movements" (PROBLEMY MIROVOGO REVOLYUTSIONNOGO PROTESTA No 4, Moscow, 1984, pp 254-270).

12. See, for example, M. McKean, "Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan," Berkeley, 1981, p 146.

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### Review of World Problems

18160005c [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, January 1988 reviews on pp 57-74 the world political situation in the "Current Problems of World Politics (1 September-10 December 1987)" roundup by V. Avakov, V. Ivanov and V. Shainberg. The first topic addressed is the summit and INF agreement, labeled a "historic breakthrough" in Soviet-American relations. This section traces the history of U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. Section two discusses international security in the Asia-Pacific region and the impact thereon of the INF treaty. The factors in play in this area are contrasted with those characteristic of Europe, and the difficulties of controlling the arms race and nuclear weapons in the Pacific are noted. The role of individual Pacific nations in U.S. strategy, the Rarotonga Treaty and the question of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia are addressed. The position of China, India, Pakistan and the Philippines on this subject is discussed also.

The final section addresses the Central America issue, taking as the point of departure the 7 August signing of the Guatemala agreement, which is described as a turning point in years of Latin American efforts to achieve peace and stability in Central America. U.S. policy and interference in the region are examined at length. The fate of the Guatemala agreement and Central American peace is said to depend on the Reagan administration's actions.

### Inordinate Militarization of Japan's Economy Not Foreseen

18160005d Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87) pp 75-87

[Article by V. Rosin: "Militarization of Japan: an Economist's View"]

[Text] The end of the 1970's. Capitalism is experiencing hard times. The consequences of the recent crisis are being overcome with difficulty. Adaptation to the new conditions of reproduction is proceeding very painfully.

A number of former principles of entrepreneurial strategy is being reexamined, new approaches to the goals and tasks of government regulation of the economy are being engendered and individual industries and, at times, whole sectors are being sacrificed to structural reorganization in the search for the contours of a growth model for the future. Which direction will economic development take and which factors will form the basis thereof? On the frontier of the 1970's-1980's this question was central in many studies devoted to the current changes in the economy of capitalist countries. The changes occurring in Japan were and continue to be analyzed particularly carefully. And this is no accident: the country has been able to proceed from the crisis upheavals comparatively rapidly, demonstrating the high adaptive capabilities of its economic system.

### Military-Economic 'Miracle' Potential

All that has been said is very indirectly related, seemingly, to the question of the militarization of the Japanese economy. However, let us not jump to final conclusions. The following circumstance, specifically, keeps us from such haste. The attention which Japan has attracted from the viewpoint of the actual and potential scale of militarization and the very seriousness of the formulation of this problem have grown in direct proportion to its successes in modernization and the enhanced engineering level of the economy. The continued strengthening of the country's economic positions in the 1980's has kindled even more the interest on the part of scholars and specialists in the particularities of the functioning of its economic mechanism and, in parallel, military aspects of development. The "military question" also is raised quite frequently from this angle or the other in many serious publications attempting to uncover the reasons for Japan's relatively felicitous entry into the final quarter of the century.

The abundance of such works and the organic interweaving of the sections on militarization into the overall logic of the arguments induce the thought that this is not simply a tribute to a comprehensive approach. The underlying motives are different here, evidently, and the arguments more substantial. First, in recent years there has been a manifest increase in the number of factors attesting a revival in certain circles of the country of revisionist and nationalist sentiments. The speeches of responsible statesmen frequently contain increasingly candid appeals for a strengthening of military preparations. And the Japanese Government's decision to abandon the military spending limit of 1 percent of GNP established in 1976 has to appear quite offensive in this context. In terms of its effect it had even greater repercussions than the public announcement several months earlier of the official statement on Tokyo's association with the American SDI program. What more convincing argument for those who are disposed to answer in the affirmative the question of whether Japan has embarked on the path of militarization?

Second, which is particularly important, Japan has accumulated tremendous economic and S&T potential. It has not only eliminated the lag in terms of economic development level behind the West European countries and the United States but has overtaken them even in a whole number of indicators. As a result the supporters of views of Japan as a growing military power have acquired one further trump card. Their logic is entirely understandable. Any policy, military included, requires a strong economic foundation and the appropriate development level of the material-technical base. In addition, the boundaries and possibilities of a military-political policy today depend more than ever before on the economic potential at a country's disposal.

Economic support for military-political doctrines has always been based on the latest equipment and technology, but at the present twist of the arms race spiral this has become even more apparent. The latest achievements of S&T progress, the most progressive spheres and sectors of the economy and highly skilled labor resources are primarily being pulled into the orbit of militarization. Clearly, a country which has not created the appropriate potential is hardly capable of sustaining the colossal load which is borne by the economy when a significant place in policy is occupied by the "military component" in this form or the other thereof.

All this is so. Both the changes in the military-political consciousness of part of Japan's ruling circles and the increased power of the economy are real facts, and facts are inexorable. They have to be reckoned with, particularly if they fit easily into the outline which has become classical almost: progress in the productive forces—growth of economic potential—formation of soil conducive to the expansion of military production. It is hard to find objections to a conscientious search for facts testing the chosen outline for soundness. But the question can and should, after all, be posed differently: to what extent does the outline itself correspond to reality? In other words, is it irreproachable and is not overall economic potential too mechanically identified with military-economic potential, and are militarist trends in political life being carried over directly into the sphere of economic activity?

On the one hand neither commonsense nor historical experience, of the last 100 years at least, are reason to doubt the need for adequate productive forces, meaning primarily their development level, for the accelerated buildup of military power. On the other, the same commonsense and the same historical experience force a renunciation of the peremptory judgment that the presence of a highly developed economy is sufficient for militarization processes.

However, it is precisely peremptoriness which can revealingly be read through the lines when for a characterization of military-economic potential data on the size of the national budget and the gross product, the leading sectors' share of the total manufactured product and so

forth are adduced. Further, there follows, as a rule, a more or less detailed description of the sectors of industry not lacking in every conceivable set of figures. And, furthermore, it is emphasized with enviable constancy how important a given specific sector is for realization of the aggressive plans of imperialism. And practically no sector escapes the lot of being tuned in one way or another in such a key. The following logical constructions have become the rule: "The bulk of capital investments is channeled into the expansion of production in sectors which are simultaneously the basis of Japan's military-industrial power. Thus in the period from 1952 through 1970 capital investments in metallurgical industry increased 30-fold..., in engineering, by a factor of more than 33..., in chemical industry, by a factor of more than 35" (1).

The point is reached where the successes in economic and S&T development are explained almost solely by preparations for military operations. We can interpret in no other way, for example, the statement that "priority (in Japan—V.R.) is given the sectors of science and technology which might serve as a sound basis for the organization of modern military production" (2). Sometimes the approach is even simpler, there being altogether no mention of the possible nonmilitary significance of spheres of the national economy. And it is then declared that "metallurgical industry (in the same Japan—V.R.) is the base for a growth of military-economic potential" (3) or that "tractor industry, which is a part of the motor-tractor industry group—depots for the production of tanks, tow trucks, power-driven units and diverse construction (for the installation, evidently, of military facilities?—V.R.) equipment—has also been developed in Japan" (4).

Despite the decisive steps of the Soviet Union and other socialist states aimed at lessening tension in the world, the threat of a global nuclear catastrophe persists at the present time, unfortunately. It is surely for this reason that the world community reacts so sensitively to the achievements of the human intellect which could be put to the service of the god of war. These fears are natural and understandable. Nonetheless, when in investigations which set, according to their authors, the goal of study of military-economic potential one encounters lengthy chapters and sections devoted to a scrupulous examination of the whole national economic complex and virtually all its components, natural perplexity arises. It is intensified even more when one fails to find in the corresponding sections nothing but an abundance of data of a technical-economic nature pertaining to various sectors of the economy. Such sections might just as happily have been accommodated in any book on the country's economy or in an econometrico-statistical reference work. Researchers professing the said approaches protect themselves in that they usually precede their computations with a very broad interpretation of military-economic potential. Thus a monograph intended, as its author writes in the preface, "...to initiate a study of Japan's military-economic potential" (5) defines this

category "as the objective possibilities of a country (or group of countries—a coalition) which could be employed in the interests of war. And inasmuch as war is a comprehensive test of the material and spiritual forces of a people, these possibilities are determined primarily..." (6). There follows a list of these possibilities occupying half a page and incorporating everything—from the political and social system of the state through the volume and structure of production, the state of finances and stocks of material resources.

"Military-economic potential" is a truly extraordinarily convenient category. It has both the military and economic ingredients. If desired, the facilities or phenomena incorporated in this potential may easily be ascribed if not to the first, then, to the second part. However, it transpires in practice that the dash becomes simply a banal equals sign, and the differences between a country's military-economic and economic potentials are erased completely. Reservations to the effect that a country's economic might is seen merely as a prerequisite of a strengthening of military power alter nothing. Playing on the universality of the "military-economic potential" category and the axiom concerning the interdependence of phenomena in the world around us cannot substitute for an analysis—extremely complex, undoubtedly—of the actual scale and degree of militarization of an economy.

Explanatory dictionaries and encyclopedic publications term potential a force and capacity which may manifest itself given conditions conducive to this. Correspondingly, economic potential means the reserves available to a country which, again given propitious conditions, may be used for purposes of economic development. It will hardly be contested by anyone that the sum total of objective and subjective factors capable of influencing the rate and nature of economic growth is of no less significance here than accessioned integral components of the potential proper. Otherwise the second part of the definition becomes completely meaningless, and it has to be acknowledged that potential is simply a reserve of various resources, possibilities and so forth. But then the content of the very concept of "potential" is emasculated. However, when the question of military potential is broached, this is frequently precisely what happens, an analysis of the factors on which the scale and prospects of "militarization" in reality depend being left out of the picture.

No one has to be persuaded that in wartime every surplus (and necessary) brick is laid in the edifice intended for military use. At the same time the information concerning economic potential is perfectly sufficient for gaining an idea of how many such bricks might be produced. In inserting in the name of the category the word "military" and underpinning it with the entire national economic complex and all the achievements of S&T progress we add precisely nothing to our knowledge of the subject of study. Unless, like Diogenes, who had lost faith in the perfection of the social structure, we

accuse of every conceivable and inconceivable sin the zealous farmer who for the first time used a plow instead of a hoe. The sole thing to which such views lead is a sense of doom, not to mention injustice in respect of the millions of people who, although working at capitalist enterprises, have devoted their lives to struggle against the actions of bourgeois governments which have underlying military motives.

In respect of Japan it would seem expedient to emphasize attention to ascertainment of precisely the factors which will have and are already having an impact on the militarization of its economy. Aside from all else, this path is further suggested by the fact that military production, granted all its specifics defined by V.I. Lenin as work "to the order of the treasury" (7), does not function in a vacuum. It is tightly interwoven in the general economic structure, and the military and military-oriented (8) sectors, in the system of intersectoral production relations. For this reason, despite such particularities as the absence of an open commodity market, manufacture of the overwhelming proportion of products per special programs and the presence of virtually a single customer in the shape of the appropriate government department, the military sector is subject to the effect of the general laws of the capitalist economy. Its characteristics depend to a considerable extent on the state of affairs in the national economy as a whole and on the trends which are predominant in economic life at a given moment in time.

The legitimacy and relevance of such an approach are obvious particularly now, when a transition to a new model of economic development is being observed in Japan and not so much quantitative as qualitative parameters of growth are moving to the fore and intensive forms of the use of material resources are predominant. The contours of the new model are only just taking shape to a large extent, and not all of them are entirely clear as yet. But one thing is obvious—a number of the principles of the functioning of the economy which were for a long time fundamental and which secured for Japan the elimination of the technological lag behind the leading countries of the West are undergoing a cardinal transformation.

What are the features of the new model of growth and what kind of influence are they exerting on the militarization of the Japanese economy? Is military business objectively becoming more attractive for private capital? It is thus, in our view, that it is necessary to pose questions, which are of the greatest importance, when it is a question of the connection between economic and military-economic potentials and the economic aspects of militarization in Japan. However, before attempting to answer them, let us see how military production in this country appears in the mid-1980's.

#### Current State of the Military Sector of the Economy

According to available data, national military industry catered in the first half of the 1980's for approximately 85-90 percent of the "Self-Defense Force's" arms and

combat equipment needs. This would indicate that the basis of an arms industry, a policy of the creation of which was instituted back at the end of the 1950's with the adoption of the first program for the development of the "Self-Defense Force" (1957-1961), is as of today fully formed. Subsequent programs also set as their goal the self-sufficient development of military production and the reduction to a minimum of dependence on foreign supplies. Back at the end of the 1970's attempts were being made abroad to estimate the extent to which Japan could, if necessary, relatively rapidly increase the production of military products. Granted all the conditionality of this indicator, many authors adduced it persistently to characterize the growing military potential of the Japanese economy and agreed on a figure of 50 percent (9).

An appreciable proportion of the military product is produced per foreign, primarily American, licenses. At the same time Japan is making significant efforts to develop and assimilate the manufacture of national models of the latest types of arms and combat equipment. Tests of the simplest Japanese cruise missiles made at plants of the Mitsubishi (dzyukoge) company have already been conducted. It is working on perfecting an unmanned tank fitted with intricate electronic instruments. The Nissan firm is completing work on the creation of air-to-air and air-to-sea missiles distinguished by very accurate guidance. This list could be continued, which is not in itself a cause of great surprise inasmuch as Japan's successes in the field of S&T progress are well known.

Worthy of mention, rather, is another fact. While developing its own military production the Japanese Government in the shape of the National Defense Agency (NDA) is not abandoning large purchases of military equipment from the United States but increasing them even. The question could arise: in what connection is the problem of imports of military products, which is of entirely independent significance and which lies in altogether a different plane than the problem of militarization of the Japanese economy proper, broached? After all, even from the purely quantitative viewpoint the role of imports in satisfaction of the "Self-Defense Force's" combat equipment and weapons requirements is negligible. Thus at the start of the 1980's the proportion of this item of expenditure in the country's military budget was not in excess of 5 percent (10). It is appropriate also in this context to recall Japan's commitments which are imposed on it by the "Security Treaty" concluded with the United States providing, inter alia, for the Japanese side's purchases of American combat equipment and weapons; the unconditional leadership of the United States in the military-technical sphere, which ensures the necessary quality of its military products; Japan's as yet highly pronounced lag in terms of the level of development of basic research, without which creation of the latest weapons systems costing, furthermore, huge sums of money is inconceivable; the demands constantly being

advanced by Washington for an expansion of purchases of American high-technology military products to reduce the U.S. deficit in the trade between the two countries.

But the angle of vision has only to be altered somewhat, more precisely, to be enlarged, for the connection between weapons imports and the development of the national military economy to appear in a new light. It is legitimate, evidently, viewing foreign purchases of missiles, warplanes and so forth not only as resources geared to a strengthening of Japan's defense potential. Nor must we lose sight of the fact that imports permit the accomplishment of the tasks advanced in the programs for development of the "Self-Defense Force" given a relative curbing of the growth of its own military production.

All the above-listed factors are influencing the choice of paths of modernization of the "Self-Defense Force," and in different periods, what is more, the significance of each of them could increase or diminish. But there is one further factor with deeper roots and of a long-term nature—profit.

It is customary to believe that military business promises companies huge profits owing to sales guarantees, a stable load on production capacity for a more or less lengthy period, the acquisition of raw materials and intermediate products at understated and the sale of the finished product at overstated prices and so forth. All this does in fact occur in reality, and companies do not, as a rule, let slip a chance to avail themselves of such propitious opportunities.

But there are other examples also. They testify that the situation could take shape differently. Specifically, higher finished product unit costs in the field of military production are a reason for Japan's substantial purchases of combat equipment in the United States. Thus for the NDA acquisition of F-15 fighters at their "home" in St Louis costs almost 50 percent less than production of the same aircraft at plants of the Mitsubishi group on a McDonnell-Douglas license. Usually such facts are explained by the narrowness of the Japanese market and the impossibility of taking full advantage of the savings from economies in scale by way of the organization of the large-series manufacture of the product.

While not denying the negative impact of the narrowness of the domestic market on production profitability, it should be pointed out that there are also obstacles of another kind to entry into the military business sphere. The state in Japan endeavors to place military orders preferably with leading, serious firms, hoping to benefit from their considerable accumulated scientific and production potential. However, it is precisely "seriousness" which at times keeps leading Japanese firms from immediately entering into partner relations with military circles, particularly if this is fraught with a marked increase in the proportion of arms in total sales. Why?

First, the major companies already have numerous opportunities for making profits.

Second, the benefits contained in the specifics of work "for defense" may easily be reduced to nothing by costs connected with the restructuring of production activity, retraining of the personnel and so forth.

Third, in linking its fate with military programs a company comes up against the danger of being "detached" for a certain period of time from the actual course of events in the civil sector of the economy, which could from the long-term angle result in a lag behind its principal competitors and lead to losses which are hard to make good. The likelihood of such "detachment" here is very high. It is at least of the same order of probability as the likelihood of a positive effect, from the businessman's viewpoint, from introduction to the progressive technology of military production. Not the least role here, in particular, is performed by the fact that simultaneously with the increased dynamism of the changes occurring in the economy the time needed for the development of modern intricate weapons systems is continuing to increase (it has now reached 12-13 years on average) (11).

Fourth, strict conditions concerning the observance of secrecy in the course of research and production activity are laid down, as a rule, at the time that a military order is given the companies. Very serious obstacles could arise in the way of the possible purely commercial use of military novelties. Specifically, it is this factor which many experts rightly put among the main ones to explain the comparatively low returns for the civil sphere from the American Strategic Computer Initiative program (12). Japanese businessmen are well aware of this lesson—after all, they can learn not only from their own but also others' experience.

Thus the attractiveness of military orders is evaluated not independently but within the framework of the system of priorities taking shape in the process of the formulation of entrepreneurial strategy.

The guarded attitude of Japanese firms toward a buildup of their own military production is specifically expressed in the way in which the proportion of the military component in manufacturing industry output is changing. For more than 10 years this indicator has remained at the same level. In addition, at the start of the 1980's it had declined somewhat even—to 0.35-0.37 percent—compared with 0.45 percent on average for the preceding 5-year period (13). Only one sector depends substantially on military orders—aircraft manufacturing. At the start of the 1980's the proportion of military aircraft in the total value of its finished product amounted to 78 percent. But here also the "degree of militarization" had diminished noticeably: in 1976 the analogous figure was approximately 89 percent. As far as all other sectors are concerned, the proportion of the military component in their gross product is less than 0.5 percent, including

such a most modern sphere as the production of electronic equipment and means of communication. Only shipbuilding, for which the said indicator is on average 4-5 percent, constitutes an exception.

Even by greatly stretching the point it cannot be said that military business has become a principal form of activity for an in any way extensive list of sectors and firms of Japanese industry. This largely predetermines the specifics of the entrepreneurial structure of the military sector, to an examination of which we now turn.

#### Military Business: Active Participants

The overall number of companies involved in supplying products of a military purpose and providing services to various military departments is over 2,400. Of these, approximately 1,500 (almost two-thirds) operate in industry.

The military sector of the economy has wider boundaries than simply the production of combat equipment and arms. It is this which explains the presence on the lists of suppliers of the NDA of a large number of firms whose products have no physical-material form. And although they make no direct contribution to the buildup of military power, their activity is an essential and very important link in the overall system of the handling of defense interests. It is a question of companies which, as NDA subcontractors, are involved in the leasing of buildings and installations, equipment hire, the training of skilled personnel per the requirements of military establishments, transportation and materials handling.

The existence of a significant number of firms the main subject of whose activity has become the handling of NDA contracts with foreign weapons suppliers should be considered one further characteristic feature of the military sector. Their functions include mediation at the time of the conclusion of deals, various consultancy services, supervision of the financial aspect of buying and selling and so forth. Approximately 140 firms, that is, virtually one out of every six firms offering services of a defense nature, specialize in purchases of military products overseas.

The said group of companies also enjoys support on the part of the state. They receive large sums for successful weapons import transactions. Such not particularly concealed concern on the part of the NDA is no accident. It ensues directly from the continuing orientation of the country's ruling circles toward foreign sources of arms as a most important means of material support for their military-strategic plans. No development of national military industry and no major successes of the latest technology will be accompanied by some in any way serious abandonment of forms of cooperation with the U.S. military-industrial complex whereby Japan will, as before, be the recipient of arms, combat equipment and their individual components and production techniques.

Highly indicative in this connection are the results of the long fight in connection with the FS-X tactical support fighter. This aircraft was, as envisaged by the sixth program for the development of the "Self-Defense Force" (fiscal years 1986-1990), to have been developed on the basis of Japanese technology to replace the F-1 fighter which is in use currently and which was built independently in Japan. However, at the end of last October the National Defense Council and the cabinet adopted a decision contrary to the original intentions. In the course of negotiations between the heads of the two countries' military departments agreement was reached on the joint Japanese-American production of the FS-X based on General Dynamics' F-16 fighter-bomber.

Does this testify that Japan has acknowledged its own powerlessness in the sphere of modern military aircraft engineering? By no means. On the contrary, the majority of specialists believe that the use of purely Japanese technology would not lead to a deterioration in the aircraft's tactical and technical specifications. In addition, it is believed that the joint production will cost the NDA more than were the order given to Japanese firms. But the reckoning is ultimately made not only in yen and dollars. In yielding to U.S. pressure the government will acquire an opportunity to demonstrate for the umpteenth time its loyalty in relation to its "Security Treaty" partner.

Military production in Japan is highly monopolized. The overwhelming proportion of the orders is placed with a small group of powerful concerns. In different years the 10 leading suppliers of military products accounted in terms of NDA orders for 62-65 percent of total production of the military sector of the economy (14). The analogous figure for the United States is approximately 33 percent. Mitsubishi (dzyukoge), the proportion of whose products in national production of weapons and combat equipment—25 percent—is far in excess of the corresponding indicator for General Dynamics (10 percent), which is the Pentagon's main supplier, stands out particularly.

The high level of monopolization of military production is combined with the negligible proportion, as a whole, of military products in the gross shipments of the companies which account for the bulk of NDA orders. Thus for Mitsubishi (dzyukoge) and Kawasaki (dzyukoge) this proportion has for a long time remained at the 10-percent level, and only in the 1982 fiscal year, under the conditions of a deterioration in economic conditions, did the companies' management agree to a certain broadening of cooperation with the NDA. As a result the proportion of military production increased for them to 17 and 14.7 percent respectively. However, in the following 1983 fiscal year even it once again declined for Mitsubishi to 11 percent. For the other company of the first three—Ishikawajima-Harima—the significance of the said indicator varies strongly by year: from 15.9 percent in the 1980 fiscal year to 4.6 percent in 1981 and a certain growth again—to 10.6 percent—in the 1982

fiscal year. For the other major suppliers of the military department for which the corresponding information is available the proportion of the military product in total production is seldom in excess of 10 percent. For example, it constituted in the 1982 fiscal year for Fuji (dzyukoge) (in 7th place in terms of value of military orders received) 4.4 percent, for Nihon Cement (8th), approximately 10 percent, and for Nissan Motor (14th), 0.3 percent (15).

Of course, official calls for a buildup of national military production (frequently linked to the mythical "Soviet threat") do not meet with objections on the part of business circles and, what is more, find broad support among them. However, we should not overlook the fact that such support usually has a perfectly definite "ceiling". Its height, of course, varies—both in terms of the times and different companies. No businessman will turn down a profitable military order if it permits an improvement in the firm's financial and economic position and a strengthening of its positions in the competitive struggle (16). But at the same time staking on military business all that has been accumulated over many years would be too precipitate a step for the major companies.

The present economic conditions and the nature of the changes in the reproduction process do not, as will be shown below, provide a simple answer to the question concerning firms' economic interest in more active involvement in military production.

This question itself is nonetheless extraordinarily important, and it is essential that the researcher attempt to approach its solution.

#### **Military Production Under the New Conditions of Economic Development: 'Pro' and 'Contra'**

The adaptation to the new conditions of reproduction which has clearly made itself felt in Japan as of the end of the 1970's is leading to radical change in many economic processes and affecting practically all aspects of economic life.

The diversification of supply and demand is rapidly gaining momentum; the active conquest of markets of commodities which are manufactured in small consignments is under way; and the predominant trend is toward a reduction in the optimum size of enterprises and unit production capacity, which, aside from all else, is lowering the barriers to small and medium-sized firms' penetration of many sectors. The said phenomena are only part, albeit, evidently, the most indicative and characteristic, of the manifold changes in the Japanese economy connected with the shaping of a new development model. A number of S&T solutions which have been "filtered" by the market mechanism and which have become the basis of the functioning of the latest spheres and the fundamental transformation of the traditional spheres of the economy have been proposed in

the course of the cardinal restructuring under way in the economy. Of all the types of new technology which have become prevalent, pride of place should be given microelectronics.

All economic subjects have found themselves faced with the need for a certain "reevaluation". Nor are the companies connected with military business any exception. It is not as yet possible to answer either "yes" or "no" to the question of whether the manufacture of combat equipment and arms becomes economically more profitable under the new conditions of reproduction. Computation of all the "pros" and "cons" from this viewpoint is complicated by at least two circumstances.

First, many of the present economic trends are still relatively young and have not manifested themselves in full. Second, one and the same trend may have a whole number of ambivalent consequences, on the one hand stimulating the activity of military production, on the other, proving to be for it a restraining factor. However, it would seem possible today even to ascertain certain most important cause-and-effect relations between the formation of the new model of Japan's economic development and particular features of the military sector of its economy.

It should be mentioned primarily that such a characteristic feature of military production as the increase in the client's already high demands on a constant upgrading of the product has come to appear differently with the development of diversification and the individualization of demand.

Such "capriciousness" has an objective basis and is predetermined by the rapid progress in the field of weapons systems reducing their depreciation time. For this reason government authorities do not desist from interference in the course of fulfillment of the order even after a contract with the firm has been concluded. Such interference frequently takes the form of an adjustment of the scale and structure of manufacture and, at times, a change in the tactical and technical indicators of the military product agreed earlier. The firm's outlays on satisfying the client's newly emerging wishes are reimbursed. However, in the years of the domination of standardized mass production, when the gamble was made primarily on the savings from economies in scale, the prospect of a constant restructuring of the production process, even if such was "paid for," was none too attractive.

Now the situation has changed. First, the customer has become more exacting in respect of the novelty, quality and individual properties of the product everywhere—in the sphere of both military and civil demand and of both industrial and personal consumption. He endeavors to acquire not simply a good mass manufactured product—"like everyone has"—but a commodity with properties "personalized to his taste. This has become a law for all commodities and all sectors of the economy.

Second, the use of microelectronic equipment capable of rapid readjustment has increased the profitability of small-series production. Companies using microprocessor technology have acquired an opportunity to make without appreciable additional capital expenditure changes to the production process for the purpose of the rapid updating of the selection of manufactured products. As a result of the said factors there is a potential increase in the economic "expediency" of firms' involvement in military industry.

The change in leader-sectors has far-reaching consequences in the militarization aspect. Today, when the high-technology sectors which do not require a large consumption of raw material, fuel and energy, and their product is becoming an irreplaceable and frequently a basic component of the latest weapons systems and combat equipment, are moving to the fore, the limited nature of Japan's fuel and raw material base is ceasing to be a limiting factor for a buildup of military production.

In fact the structural reorganization of the economy and the very development of technology are extending the boundaries of the military sector of the economy in the leading capitalist countries. This is occurring as a result of the fact that a significant portion of the product of the science-intensive sectors may be used equally successfully for both civil and military purposes. In other words, it is dual-purpose. At the current stage of the development of the productive forces the proportion of such products in the total volume of commodities produced is rising. Obviously, a country taking a pronounced step forward along the path of the practical application of "high technology" simultaneously creates or may create the prerequisites for an increase in its military power and earns for itself the reputation of a growing center not only of economic but also—potentially, at least—military power.

It is such "fame" which has been secured by Japan, which has advanced considerably in the development and manufacture of dual-purpose high-technology products. While not formally fulfilling military orders, Japanese firms may be working actively on an arms buildup. No "requalification" and practically no readjustment of production are needed for this. It is sufficient that preference ultimately be given just one of the two aspects of the possible use of the commodities produced by the company. This applies to integrated circuits, fiber optics, many types of precision ceramics and amorphous-structure metals and a whole number of other commodities, in the development and production of which Japan has outpaced the majority of Western countries, including the United States. It was with good reason that the Pentagon defined 16 areas of S&T progress in which the United States would like to gain access to the achievements of its junior partner in the military-political alliance. Not fortuitous either was the stubbornness with which the Reagan administration demanded of the Japanese Government official confirmation of its participation in the SDI program.

At the same time the new model of economic development has brought with it not only stimulators but also inhibitors of the trend toward the militarization of Japan's economy. I would like to dwell on those of them which are, in our view, of the greatest force and of a long-term nature.

The first limiting factor is connected with the restructuring of the system of intersectoral production relations. It is a question of an ongoing process of a narrowing of the circle of sectors catering for the bulk of the economy's need for means and subjects of labor. The said change is graphically demonstrated in the example of the role being performed in Japan currently by electronics industry.

The product of this sector occupies an increasingly prominent place in the commodity flows going to satisfy intermediate and final demand. Expenditure on the purchase of electronic equipment is today becoming virtually the main component of capital outlays made by companies in practically all spheres of the national economy. Operating capacity is being updated and laborious operations, where quite recently even it was difficult to imagine the possibility of man being replaced by a machine, are being automated on the basis of micro-electronic technology. Further, computer equipment is increasingly becoming an object of personal consumption. Nor should it be forgotten that Japan's export expansion is also based to a strong extent on the export of electronics industry products. The rapid obsolescence of electronic hardware is pushing up demand on the domestic and foreign markets.

In the situation of high and relatively steadily growing demand for their products the electronics and electrical engineering companies comparatively seldom have a need, all other things being equal, to specially turn to military production as a means of overcoming temporary difficulties in business activity. The main "merit" of military orders—the dependability of sale of the product and the guaranteed load on production capacity in the event of a slump in business activity—is not that pertinent today inasmuch as an overproduction crisis hardly presents a threat to electronics industry in the coming years.

There is no serious reason to anticipate that priority will unequivocally be given, within Japan, at least, the military application of dual-purpose science-intensive products. An analysis of the problems confronting the country's economy at the current stage leads to this affirmation. Despite the high adaptiveness to changes in the overall conditions of reproduction, it is not in a position to completely escape the difficulties arising in the course of formation of the new development model. These amount to a deceleration of the rate of economic growth and sectoral disproportions, the problem of labor resources connected with the aging of the population, the

huge national debt, foreign trade discord with its partners and the negative consequences of the rise in the yen's exchange rate and so forth.

A most "painful" problem is the lagging of the available material base behind the demands of the structural reorganization of the economy, which is emphasized by many Japanese specialists and officials. The solution or, at least, easing of the said problems demands the permanent mobilization of all national resources and, specifically, the creation of the necessary stocks for the future in the field of basic research, in which Japan's positions against the background of a number of other countries are not yet that strong. Among sober-minded Japanese with a certain influence on the policy of the ruling circles the opinion is to be heard increasingly often that the country will hardly be capable of tackling these tasks if it embarks on the path of militarization of the economy. And we see no reason to believe that the growing revanchist mood will necessarily gain the ascendancy over this approach.

One further inhibitor of the militarization of economic life built in to the new growth model is connected with the flattening out of the economic cycle. The increased role of services and, as a whole, nonmaterial factors in the development of the economy, the winding down of the scale of intersectoral relations on the part of the base sectors of industry and, consequently, the less the susceptibility of associated demand to changes in economic conditions, the lessening of the multiplier effect of new capital construction—these and a whole number of other factors have led to a relative stabilization of economic growth and a diminution in the range of fluctuations between "peaks" and "troughs" of business activity. As a result military production is losing its attractiveness to a certain extent as a possible method of overcoming slumps in economic conditions.

The "neoconservative wave" characterized by a relative reduction in government interference in the economy is operating in the same direction also. Administrative-financial reform has been the concentrated expression of the neoconservative approach in Japan (17). It by no means presupposes a blunting of attention to military questions. However, the lifting or diluting of individual official regulations and granting market forces greater freedom is, evidently, objectively increasing the relative isolation of arms production as a sphere which has traditionally functioned and continues to function under strict government control. This will hardly stimulate the activity of entrepreneurs in respect of military business.

Ascertainment of the inhibitors of the militarization of the Japanese economy least pursues the goal of glossing over the aggressive nature of imperialism. The greater a country's economic potential, the more its opportunities for demonstrating it, in the military sphere included. The unequivocal expectation of such opportunities is, perhaps, one of Washington's principal motives in its

endeavor to tie Japan more closely to its military-strategic plans. If the question is viewed from this angle and it is considered that in this form or the other Japanese S&T knowhow is already being passed on to American firms manufacturing the latest weapons systems, it is legitimate to speak, it would seem, of the growth of the role of the Japanese center in the overall correlation of military forces between socialism and capitalism.

But this is a separate problem requiring a special investigation and it cannot be confused with another problem—the country's conversion into an important military power. There is no direct correlation between the contribution of Japan as a powerful economic center to the correlation of the military-strategic forces of the two systems and the degree of militarization of its economy. The military sector is growing in far from the proportion in which the country's economic and S&T potential is increasing.

Of course, nor can there be any question of any movement back on the path of the development of military production. But speaking of the fatally inevitable militarization of the Japanese economy to the level reached in the majority of imperialist states, in the United States even more, is just as unwarranted. The complex interweaving of trends in the economic life of present-day Japan, in particular, testifies in support of this assessment. Taking the analysis thereof as a basis, it may be maintained with a high degree of assurance that the action of the most important economic factors is not leading to an unconditional increase in the dimensions of the military sector and is not contributing to the unequivocal conversion of economic potential into the kinetic energy of arms production.

#### Footnotes

1. A.P. Markov, "Japan's Postwar Policy in Asia and China. 1945-1977," Moscow, 1979, p 153.
2. A.P. Markov, "Japan: Policy of Armament," Moscow, 1970, p 81.
3. M.I. Ivanov, "Growth of Militarism in Japan," Moscow, 1982, p 82.
4. Ibid., pp 93-94.
5. S.T. Mazhorov, "Modern Japan's Military-Economic Potential," Moscow, 1979, p 10.
6. Ibid., p 11.
7. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 32, p 319.
8. It is customary to attribute to the military sectors those whose capacity is loaded by manufacture of military products to the extent of 50 percent and more, to the military-oriented sectors, less than 50 percent. The

"lower limit" of the military-oriented sectors is not fixed, as a rule. This could lead to an exaggeration of the scale of the military sector in the economy. However, for Japan, as will be shown below, even such a broad interpretation does not change the overall picture of industry's comparatively slight involvement in the fulfillment of military orders.

9. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 5-11 December 1980, p 55.

10. Estimated from "Japan Economic Almanac. 1985," Tokyo, 1985, p 116; R. Drifte, "Japan's Growing Arms Industry," PSIS Occasional Papers, Geneva, July 1985, p 23.

11. R.A. Faramazyan, "The Military Economy of American Imperialism," Moscow, 1983, p 69.

12. The Strategic Computer Initiative is a special Pentagon program geared to the development of new-generation computers capable of simulating man's intellectual activity. It is anticipated that the use of such computers will make it possible to create fundamentally new models of military equipment (see U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 26 August 1985, p 46).

13. Estimated from "Defense Yearbook. 1984," Tokyo, 1984, p 475.

14. "Japan Economic Yearbook. 1981/1982," Tokyo, 1982, p 124.

15. "Military Industry," Tokyo, 1983, pp 215-227; MEMO No 7, 1987, p 36.

16. There are in Japan, however, limitations on the profit norm established by the NDA for its suppliers. For more detail see MEMO No 7, 1987, p 38.

17. See MEMO No 7, 1986, pp 58-68.

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#### Commentary on New York Stock Market Crash

18160005e [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, January 1988 publishes two articles, "Year of the Panic" by I. Grigoryev (pp 88-92) and "The New York Stock Market Crash" by V. Kuznetsov (pp 93-97), inaugurating a new series under the rubric "The Economy of the Capitalist World in 1987" in response to readers' wishes.

Grigoryev's article reviews the economic situation in the capitalist world during 1986 and 1987 to set the scene for the New York stock market crash of 19 October 1987 and the reaction of other capitalist markets to it.

Kuznetsov's article views the crash from a U.S. perspective and examines the causes of the "speculative boom" and crash and the subsequent consequences for the market.

### Discussion of General Motors Restructuring

18160005f [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, January 1988 carries on pp 98-103 an article by A. Sterlin entitled "General Motors: Ways of Improving Management". Faced with a decline in competitiveness, GM embarked on a radical reorganization of its activity in 1981. The article traces the changes in the corporation's managerial, personnel, financial and investment philosophies, including diversification automation and computerization. It also notes some difficulties encountered in the process, namely, confusion as to areas of responsibility. Sterlin points out that "critics claim that the reorganization was introduced without sufficient preparation." He concludes the article by noting that the radical reforms in the management mechanism such as are taking place in GM "are always painful. They encounter both open and passive resistance on the part of workers whose interests are encroached upon in the process of change."

### Significance of NATO Activity on Northern Flank Questioned

18160005g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87) pp 104-108

[Article by S. Morgachev: "The Question of 'Northern Balance'"]

[Text] "Northern balance" concepts claim to theoretically reflect international relations in a key part of the world from the military-political viewpoint—the European North. They play an important part in the shaping of the foreign policy of Norway, Denmark and Sweden and merit closer attention than is paid to them in Soviet literature on problems of the North European region.

The "northern balance" idea has received the most systemic and consummate treatment in the works of the Norwegian political scientist Ane Olaf Brundtland. The pronouncements on this subject of other North European political scientists and, equally, politicians sharing this interpretation or the other of "balance" are quite fragmentary. We would note also that the prevalence of the very term "northern balance" and a number of corresponding political science and official cliches is connected to this extent or the other with the article of the same name by A. Brundtland published in 1966 by the well-known COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

journal. This point in time should not, however, be thought to be the birth of the "balance" idea inasmuch as the said work was essentially reflecting and formalizing stereotypes which had already evolved by that time in Norway's political circles. A study of official copy shows that A. Brundtland's further works also correspond, as a whole, to the ideas concerning the principles of international relations in North Europe predominant in bourgeois and also, to a considerable extent, in social democratic circles of Norway and Denmark and echoing to a considerable extent the views on the "northern balance" prevalent in Sweden.

So, to what does A. Brundtland's theory amount? It introduces primarily static and dynamic regional "balance" concepts. "Static northern balance" implies that "the three different types of security policy to which the four neighbor countries in North Europe adhere (1) form a system" (2), and this system represents "equilibrium" (3).

The concept of equipoise, which, in turn, presupposes the equality, uniform-character aspect of some components, corresponds most precisely in Russian to the term "equilibrium". Equality of what? A comparison of the military potentials of the northern countries would be of a nature detached from actual political reality, as would the idea of an isolated armed conflict between them. As far as attempts to ascertain the correlation of forces of the military-political blocs in the North Europe area are concerned, this task is insoluble inasmuch as the boundaries of the analysis move apart to planetary proportions as the numerous factors determining the military situation in this region are enlisted therein. The concept of regional military parity within an East-West relations framework is at the present time losing, if it has not already lost, independent significance. A correlation of individual quantitatively commensurable components of regional military power only may be productive here, given an understanding of its relative, intermediate significance as an instrument of the analysis of the regional and global situation. Any component of contemporary relations between the military-political blocs is meaningful only in a global context; moreover, if it is a question of a regional situation, this context determines it to a far greater extent than factors of "local provenance". This applies fully to North Europe and the idea of military-political equipoise in this region.

However, A. Brundtland bases the concept of "static northern balance" not on the idea of military parity even but on a different, even more vulnerable approach. "The northern balance concept," he writes, "pertains to a balance in limitations on the use of political or military strength" (by the great powers—S.M.). This means that the relations of the leading NATO countries with Denmark and Norway limited by the "nonbase" and "non-nuclear" policy of the latter are artificially put on the same footing as the relations of the Soviet Union and

Finland based on the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty, which has, *inter alia*, articles concerning the military security of the two sides.

Yet there are absolutely no grounds not only for the identification but for a comparison of these relations in general. The Soviet Union and Finland have never exercised and do not now exercise any military cooperation, whereas NATO military maneuvers, very large-scale ones included, are conducted regularly and an infrastructure of, without exaggeration, tremendous significance for the North Atlantic bloc—airfields, dumps, supply bases, electronic control, communications and tracking centers and so forth—has been created on the territory of Norway and Denmark. As far as a potential crisis situation is concerned, the policy of Norway and Denmark in this event permits the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory. In the relations of the Soviet Union and Finland such a possibility is precluded. Thus there should be no talk of the uniform-quality aspect of the methods of the "use of political or military strength" or, equally, of the "static northern balance" which have evolved in North Europe.

The essence of the "dynamic northern balance" consists, A. Brundtland maintains, of the following: "The security policy of each northern country... is influenced by the security policy of one or several other northern countries, and the situation remains stable inasmuch as expectations concerning changes in the security policy of one country are capable of deterring potential aspirations to changes in security policy in the other countries. This may be seen as a regularity regardless of whether the initiative for such changes emanates from this northern country or the other or from one or several... great powers with, from the viewpoint of security policy, interests in North Europe" (3). Or, to use other statements of A. Brundtland, "dynamic northern balance" theory is a "theory of stability based on the possibilities of retaliatory reactions" and a model which is "fruitful for explaining the dynamic relationship between northern countries' security policies." Thus the key "dynamic northern balance" concepts may be considered the capacity of the corresponding international-political subsystem for self-regulation, its stability and, finally, the interdependence of its components.

To substantiate the idea of self-regulation A. Brundtland turns primarily to the events of 1961, when the Soviet Union proposed to the Finnish Government military and political consultations in accordance with article 2 of the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty. The proposal was made in the atmosphere of a general exacerbation of international tension in Europe, specifically, the increased military and political assertiveness of the FRG in the north of the continent, which was manifested particularly distinctly in the preparations for the creation of a joint Danish-West German command in the zone of the Baltic channels. Subsequently the Soviet side deemed it possible to defer the consultations, taking into consideration the opinion of

President U.K. Kekkonen that the initiation thereof could exacerbate the situation and also considering a number of other circumstances.

A. Brundtland points to the statement made by Norway at that time concerning the possibility of the abandonment of the "nonbase" and "nonnuclear" policy. He interprets the development of events thus: the "destabilizing impetus" on the part of the Soviet Union (the consultations proposal) was arrested by the Norwegian "warnings," and the "northern balance" system thus demonstrated the capacity for self-regulation based on the principle of deterrence. The originating feature of the whole situation here—the FRG's military assertiveness in the North European region—somehow disappears from the field of vision and moves out of the frame of the "model". Yet it was this assertiveness which had played the part of a destabilizer, whose effect not only was not arrested by the system of regional relations but, on the contrary, was intensified by it. Following the Soviet proposal concerning consultations, the negotiations on the creation of a Danish-West German command were speeded up, and, as A. Brundtland himself writes, what is more, "Denmark... wished to show that no one intended being deterred by the Soviet Union." The system thus failed to manifest a capacity for preserving the "status quo". On the contrary, it revealed potential for internal tension realized in indications of destabilization. Had it not been for the flexibility and restraint of the Soviet Union, these indications could have been expressed more distinctly and have had severe consequences for the situation in the region and beyond.

The model of a self-regulating political system proposed by A. Brundtland is altogether hardly applicable to actual reality, if only to the extent that it proceeds from the fact that the sides are intent on avoiding actions capable of provoking retaliatory measures leading to a further rise in the level of tension. The postwar development of events in the sphere of military policy has shown that this premise is by no means always correct. This could be maintained in reference to the activity of the United States and NATO in the North European region also.

It is appropriate in this connection to pose the question of whether the situation in North Europe is really characterized by stability, as the "northern balance" concept declares. If stability is regarded as an absence of acute international crises and serious conflicts, such stability exists and has done for quite some time. However, the nature of relations between the two military-political blocs at any point on the globe depends directly and primarily on the nature of these relations as a whole (although, on the other hand, the way to an improvement therein lies via regional measures also). For this reason the relative tranquillity in the North European region cannot be understood only as a consequence of the interaction of political forces at the regional level and, thus, does not correspond to the understanding of stability suggested by the "northern balance" concept.

If we understand by stability the preservation of a certain, more or less constant and quite low level of tension, this condition of the system correlates inadequately with the actual development of events in the European North. In the last 15 years the nature of the military activity of the North Atlantic bloc in this area has undergone qualitative change. An increase in the scale, duration and frequency of NATO maneuvers, the participation in them of nuclear delivery systems, the growth of the presence of the United States in the waters of the Norwegian Sea and the airspace above them, the creation of a vast infrastructure, preparations for Norway and Denmark's admittance of RDF and the installation in Norway of "unmanned bases" for them—all these features in their interaction have considerably devalued the "nonnuclear" and "nonbase" policy of NATO's Scandinavian members. There is a trend toward a growth of the level of tension in the region.

Upholding the ideas of the stability of the North European region and its capacity for self-regulation under these conditions is difficult, and it is for this reason, evidently, that in a later work A. Brundtland propounds the "dynamic northern balance" concept in a somewhat different and less binding form. He writes that the possibility of retaliatory reactions "promotes the moderation" of the North European countries in the pursuit of their foreign policy (6). This is, perhaps, true in the general sense that no state in the world can ignore the interests of its partners. There arises, however, the question of what is to be understood by moderation and whether it is possible to identify the nature of the policy of NATO countries in North Europe with this concept. As a whole, however, this quite banal opinion enables A. Brundtland to brush up his theory. Having essentially abandoned the idea of stability in the region (although not formally) and starting from what remains of the idea of self-regulation, that is, from the concept of retaliatory reaction, A. Brundtland endeavors on the basis thereof to explain the negative development of the situation in the European North, regarding his conclusions as being in the channel of the "balance" concept.

A. Brundtland speaks in the sense that NATO activity in North Europe represents a regional response to the development of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Thus he connects the deployment in Norway of heavy arms dumps for the NATO RDF with the growth of the significance of Norwegian territory for ASW operations and the broadening of the Soviet Union's opportunities for hampering the transfer to Norway of NATO reinforcements.

It should be said here that, first, the accelerated development of the Northern Fleet was itself a response to the military programs of the United States, specifically, in the sphere of strategic submarine construction, and was aimed at achieving and maintaining strategic parity, by virtue of which formulation of the question of some countermeasures, regional included, on the part of NATO would seem groundless. Second, the reasoning

concerning the need to defend facilities of the NATO infrastructure in Norway can hardly be seen as an argument inasmuch as the installation of this infrastructure was an unprovoked destabilizing action. It transpires that the consequences of some destabilizing decisions are presented as being the "objective" grounds for others. Finally, the deployment in the North European area of American cruise missiles cannot even conditionally be explained in categories of the regional military situation. In the context of the global situation, however, it is, to judge by everything, of an offensive thrust.

If we turn aside for a time from the political tendentiousness with which A. Brundtland handles the retaliatory reaction concept, the vulnerability of his positions in the field of military theory also becomes apparent. Calculations involving such categories as "maintaining control of territory" and "transfer of reinforcements" are becoming increasingly pointless, if they have not already become such, from the viewpoint of modern military-technical realities. Military preparations could hardly change in the event of a nuclear conflict the fate of Norway, the vast majority of militarily significant facilities on whose territory would be wiped out in the very first hours of military operations. We may be certain also that no measures implemented by NATO in the region would prevent the Northern Fleet performing, should the need arise, a necessary minimum of its functions. For this reason many of NATO's actions on its northern flank are devoid of real military significance.

Theoretically the following point is important also. A. Brundtland does not even mention the fact that, having been confronted with this regional "challenge" or the other, a great power could, say, transfer its retaliatory actions to the global level or another region (such an acknowledgment would undermine the remnants of the regional balance concept), not to mention a renunciation of any power reaction in view of its pointlessness or harmfulness even. Yet, from the viewpoint of modern military realities, none of these hypothetical versions is precluded.

As it is a question of North Europe, the Soviet Union not only has not deemed necessary an analogous response to the buildup here of the military activity of NATO and the United States but, on the contrary, adopted a decision on a reduction in its armed forces in the region. Account was taken here of the futility of a power approach to the solution of international problems, the importance of confidence-building measures and the possibilities of maneuver afforded by the contemporary military-technical and military-political situation. Were the Soviet Union to operate according to the power logic of the "northern balance," the situation in North Europe could reach a dangerous tension level.

Finally, concerning the idea of the interdependence of the foreign policy of the states located or with interests in the area of the European North. It is indeed difficult to

deny that the international situation and the foreign policy of the countries of the region are interconnected. It is important to comprehend how precisely this idea is interpreted and used.

In "northern balance" concepts, of A. Brundtland included, the idea of the political interdependence of the northern countries is attended by a tendentious interpretation of the development of the international situation in North Europe justifying destabilizing actions on the part of the West. This only compromises the idea itself. In addition—and this should be emphasized particularly—it is devoid in the understanding of "northern balance" theorists of any constructive value inasmuch as they fail to see in the context thereof altogether the possibility of a lessening of tension in North Europe.

Yet such a development would now seem more attainable than ever. At the end of 1986 the Soviet Union reported the dismantling of medium-range missile launchers on the Kola peninsula and most of the analogous arms on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts and also the redeployment from these districts of several operational and tactical missile battalions. A willingness was expressed in the event of agreements being reached on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe to withdraw Soviet ballistic missile-firing submarines from the Baltic and the validity of all previous Soviet proposals on the question of a strengthening of the nuclear-free status of the North European area was confirmed. The USSR has also presented specific proposals pertaining to confidence-building measures in the region, calling for a start on limitation of the intensity of military exercises and for use to be made of the experience of the Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea and in the airspace above.

A limitation of exercises of Soviet armed forces in areas close to the borders of the northern countries was announced in October 1987. A start on consultations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on a reduction in the military activity of navies and air forces in the waters of the Baltic and the North, Norwegian and Greenland seas and the extension to them of confidence-building measures was proposed also. It was pointed out that the latter could include, *inter alia*, accords on a limitation of rivalry in ASW weapons, notification of large-scale naval and air exercises and the invitation to them of foreign observers. The Soviet Union proposed also examination of the question of a ban on naval activity on intensive shipping routes. Finally, a readiness for broad international cooperation in the development of the natural resources of the North and protection of the environment was emphasized (7).

Thus a whole set of constructive peace proposals. The Soviet side has created the conditions the most conducive to representatives of political circles of the United States and the North European NATO countries displaying their "sense of balance" and concern for the stability

of the situation in the north of the continent. However, the NATO countries are in no hurry to take reciprocal steps; on the contrary, they are, as before, for example, making no serious move forward on the question of a strengthening of the region's nuclear-free status, thereby revealing the unconstructive nature of their interpretations of the dialectics of regional relations.

The signing in December 1987 of the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is also directly related to the development of regional sets of international relations. A new situation essentially arises in the question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe inasmuch as henceforward the process of a reduction in nuclear arms on the European continent becomes a base for activity in this field. Linkage with the broad European context, which has long been the basis of the approach of Oslo and Copenhagen to problems of the zone, is hereby secured. They see the achievement of real results in a lowering of the level of the nuclear confrontation in Europe as a precondition of a more active policy in the sphere of strengthening the nuclear-free status of the North European region. This logic admits of only one way of spreading the impetus of military detente: from the higher—global—level of international relations to the lower—regional—level. Such a categorical approach is hardly warranted. Whatever the case, 1988 will show whether it has been a question of real adherence to a particular view of mechanisms of disarmament and detente or of political maneuvering. The place which the struggle for a nuclear-free North occupies in the actual hierarchy of values of the political circles of Norway and Denmark will become clearer also.

The idea of the interrelationship of the foreign policy of the North European states and the political unity of the region could be used in the interests of peace and security in the North of the continent. Expressed in the form of the principle of mutual concessions and a joint endeavor to find political solutions acceptable to all parties, this generally elementary prerequisite could serve as the basis of a process of strengthening international trust in this part of the world. This is the kind of "northern balance" theory which could be worth talking about.

#### Footnotes

1. As known, Norway and Denmark are NATO members, and these countries' participation is limited, what is more, by the principle, which they exercise on a voluntary basis, of renunciation of the deployment on their territory in peacetime of foreign military bases and nuclear weapons; Sweden pursues a policy of "freedom from alliances in peacetime for the purpose of exercising neutrality in the event of war"; Finland's foreign policy is based on the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union.

2. NUPI-NOTAT, December 1981, p. 2.

3. See "Urho Kekkonen: a Statesman for Peace," Helsinki, 1975, p 97.
4. NUPI-NOTAT, December 1981, p 1.
5. "Urho Kekkonen: a Statesman for Peace," p 97.
6. See INTERNASJONAL POLITIKK No 2, 1983, p 209.
7. See PRAVDA, 2 October 1987.

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#### World Oil Situation Reviewed

18160005h [Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, January 1988 publishes two articles on the world oil situation under the rubric "Two Views of the Problem".

The first article, "The World Oil Market: Evolution of the Structure and Price Revolution," by Ye. Khartukov (pp 109-122) examines the basis for the "appreciable change in the price mechanism of the world oil market," beginning with a review of the "radical structural changes which took place in the oil supply system of the capitalist economy as of the 1970's and which brought about substantial changes in the nature of the functioning of the most important energy resource market today." In section two of the article the author discusses the role of OPEC as of the 1970's and the increased politicization and destabilization of the world capitalist oil market during the period. Khartukov says, "we may conclude that the basis of the 'collapse' of the world oil price was the intensive structural reorganization of the capitalist oil market accompanied by an increase in the role of objective economic (market, in particular) factors of price formation and that the driving force of the avalanche-like fall in the uncontrollable oil price was the short-lived and impetuous development of profiteering transactions provoked by OPEC's announcement of its readiness to begin a fight for a just recarving of the dwindling oil market." The article's concluding section deals with the influence of market factors on price dynamics.

The second article "Reasons for the Fall in and Prospects of the Dynamics of the Price of Oil" by I. Bashmakov (pp 123-133) analyzes various ideas concerning prospects of the dynamics of the oil price and the factors which will determine it. It examines the reasons for the fall in the oil price, speculates on whether it will remain low and projects the evolution of oil price dynamics through the year 2020. Bashmakov concludes as follows: "The fluctuating nature of the dynamics of the oil price

will evidently continue. An upsurge therein is possible as a result, say, of a halt to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. On the other hand, the significant overproduction of oil in OPEC countries and their incapacity for keeping production within the framework of the quotas which they themselves have set could bring about a new price 'collapse'."

**UN World Economy Database Proposed**  
*18160005i Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87) pp 134-136*

[V. Petrov report: "Questions of International Economic Security"]

[Text]A discussion was conducted in the Moscow Institute of the National Economy imeni G.V. Plekhanov of problems of international economic security. Professors and lecturers of the institute and representatives of other organizations and establishments took part.

Opening the meeting, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Groshev, dean of the institute, emphasized that the 27th CPSU Congress had substantiated the need for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. This initiative is actively supported by the progressive world community.

The purpose of the "roundtable" of international affairs specialists organized in the institute, V. Groshev observed, was an exchange of opinions and the results of research in this field, an analysis of new trends and ascertainment of the factors promoting and impeding the creation and strengthening of international economic security.

Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Fedorov, assistant dean of the institute, dwelt on two aspects. First, the interest of all participants was needed for realization of the idea of international economic security. Each country has its own "balance of interests," and its position on the question of international economic security will depend on how fully its general international and specific (national) components are taken into consideration.

Second, the increased need for the theoretical elaboration of the subject. The point of departure of the study should obviously be the search for a common pivot of cooperation. Building a system of economic security by taking as one's reference point only the specific laws of this formation or the other is hardly possible in a world in which societies at different stages of historical development coexist. Such a pivot could and should be the general law of increased social labor productivity or the law of time savings.

Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Borodayevskiy (All-Union Correspondence Financial-Economic Institute) dwelt on certain general theoretical aspects of the problem of international economic security. Under conditions where the internationalization of economic life has assumed unprecedented proportions and where the international division of labor is appearing in new, frequently technologically conditioned forms, particular importance is attached to factors of the long-term and stable nature of the relations of the cooperating parties.

The arsenal of foreign economic policy of any state incorporates measures of a uni-, bi- and multilateral nature. A striking example of use of resources of the first type is the current restructuring of the system of the USSR's foreign economic relations. Important decisions in this sphere, in respect of improving legislation included, are being adopted by our country unilaterally and being combined with a policy of the creation of joint ventures and the development of direct joint-labor relations between enterprises of different countries forming a new direction of the expansion and intensification of cooperation on a bilateral basis. And, finally, of course, the Soviet Union is purposefully pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the fraternal countries, endeavoring to impart new impetus to the integration processes in CEMA. It is an active participant in such representative international forums on economic issues as UNCTAD, supports contacts with the EC for the purpose of the creation of a truly all-European system of cooperation and is pursuing a constructive policy of the development of relations with countries of the Pacific and other regions of the world.

However, the efficacy of our country's economic policy is being limited, specifically, by both nonmembership of the GATT and many other international economic organizations and a concept of foreign economic strategy which has been clearly formulated by our science. Preparations for the convening of a representative international economic security congress should evidently incorporate the in-depth and comprehensive study, extensive discussion and subsequent active propaganda of the provisions and principles of this strategy which are adopted.

In the opinion of Doctor of Economic Sciences Ye. Zhukov (the institute) it is a question of movement toward a new international economic order which would satisfy the interests of all parties operating within the framework of world economic relations.

At the present time many of them are concentrated in the currency-finance sphere. Specifically, international economic security is being hampered by the crisis of government finances expressed in the growth of budget deficits and the national debt in a number of leading capitalist countries, the interest rate policy of the United

States, the frequent fluctuations in the exchange rate of the dollar and other main currencies, speculative tendencies of the loan capital market and the developing countries' debt.

Certain problems have been caused by the regional narrowness of the currency of socialist integration—the transfer ruble—and the lack of its relationship with world money.

A certain regional proportionality in the system of the international division of labor, particularly between socialist and nonsocialist countries, is important for international economic security, Candidate of Economic Sciences Yu. Shamray (USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade All-Union Research and Design Institute) believes. The more proportional this system and the more dependable and rhythmic the economic relations between individual countries, the stronger, consequently, the foundations of international economic security and vice versa.

There is an absence of sufficient proportionality in forms of the USSR's foreign economic relations also. The forms and methods of commercial and production cooperation with foreign countries were until recently oriented mainly toward conventional, so-called classical commodity exchange. International production cooperation with partners from other countries is inadequately developed, the scale of the joint construction and operation of production facilities is negligible and only the first steps are being taken in the creation of joint ventures and the development of other forms of joint entrepreneurial activity. Commodity flows are thus not being buttressed by the movement of production resources. As a result the organizational structure of the USSR's foreign economic relations does not correspond to the modern structure of international economic relations. A transition to broad production cooperation would strengthen the economic foundations of international economic security inasmuch as the economic relations arising on the basis of production cooperation and other forms are more intensive, more stable and stronger than conventional trade relations.

Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Kopylov (Moscow Institute of the National Economy) dwelt on certain questions of competitive relations on national and world markets. A mastery of competitive relations primarily on the scale of the national market may be considered a component of preparation and activity under the new conditions. This is important in connection with the commissioning of the new economic mechanism, the concept of which was formulated at the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum.

The report of Candidate of Economic Sciences Yu. Panevin (Moscow Institute of the National Economy) dealt with the fact that S&T progress is creating the objective prerequisites for world economic and S&T cooperation.

On what basis should relations of intersystem economic dealings be organized? The platform should be, as already mentioned, the law of increased social labor productivity. We obviously need to acquire primarily not what is cheap but what embodies the latest achievements of S&T progress.

A. Spartak (USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade All-Union Research and Design Institute) observed that the idea of international economic security should proceed from an analysis of the world economy as an integral system in need of fundamentally new theoretical and practical approaches.

The future fundamental outline of a program of international economic security could preliminarily appear in the form of interrelated stabilizing and regulating measures whose ultimate purpose is ensuring predictability and controllability in world-economic dealings. The latter presupposes the existence of an adequate system of intermediary bodies of multilateral economic cooperation whose activity it is essential to bring into line with the demands for the increased internationalization of economic life.

The recent events in Poland, W. Filar (Poland) observed, are an example of the persistent endeavor of the ruling circles of the United States and other imperialist states to subordinate the sphere of East-West economic cooperation to the goals of global confrontation.

Since August 1980 the Western powers have restricted economic cooperation with Poland, endeavoring to intensify the economic difficulties and provoke antigovernment protests. In the most difficult period Poland appealed for assistance to the members of the socialist community. It is in close diversified economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that a guarantee of Poland's successful development is seen.

Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye. Zvonova (Moscow Institute of the National Economy) dwelt on the emergent countries' external debt—a serious problem in the present system of world economic relations. Payment of the foreign debt is impossible only by way of new loans from partners in international economic relations. There naturally arises the question of the productive use of loan capital obtained from abroad. The foreign debt is, consequently, a problem of both the domestic economy and of partnership in world economic relations.

Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Aleksandrov (Moscow Institute of the National Economy) emphasized that the need for elaboration of a concept of international economic security and an effective mechanism of its realization within the framework of international organizations has been brought about by the complex nature of the problems of the contemporary world economy, whose solution is possible as a result of the cooperation of all countries of the world community.

Of course, a universal security system can and should have regional and subregional subsystems. It would be expedient from the very outset to propound new initiatives in the sphere of regional and subregional cooperation in the context of an underlying idea of a concept of international economic security presupposing that no economic damage be inflicted either on the direct participants in the economic dealings or on third countries.

Ye. Kudrova (Moscow Institute of the National Economy) observed that it would be useful to assure the functioning of a system of international economic security to create a global world economy information system based on the use of modern computer technology and extended qualitative analysis methods.

It would be expedient for this purpose to extend the sphere of activity of the United Nations, creating within the framework of this international organization a permanent body which would provide for the functioning of a system for the accomplishment of tasks connected with the safeguarding of international security and the equal economic cooperation of all states.

A working group headed by V. Fedorov was set up in the Moscow Institute of the National Economy imeni G.V. Plekhanov for further study of problems of international economic security.

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#### Military Strength a Principal Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy

18160005j Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNRODNNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87) pp 148-149

[V. Milshteyn review: "Genesis of Neoglobalism"]

[Text] We have before us a comprehensive study\* of the geopolitics of the United States and its development since WWII. Until recently this subject was broached only in connection with a criticism of militarism and other aspects of U.S. policy. The authors set as their goal the ascertainment of how specifically the geopolitical approach in Washington's foreign policy activity was manifested in the period 1941-1985 and how far it corresponded on the one hand to the country's possibilities and, on the other, to the realities of the postwar world. They also inquired into questions connected with the evolution of American foreign policy and its consequences.

The scale of the set assignment and the amount of work needed to accomplish it are obvious. Confining the framework of the investigation to an analysis of the United States' relations with West Europe, in which the

geopolitical approach of U.S. imperialism has been manifested under the specific conditions of the "transatlantic alliance," would seem for this reason warranted. Inclusion of the WWII period in the contemporary stage of this state's foreign policy would seem legitimate also. It was at this time that the theoretical foundations were laid and the practical prerequisites created for its post-war foreign policy course.

The monograph makes a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the establishment of the United States' hegemonist positions in the capitalist world and also the methods of their impact on allied countries. Thus, it is observed that as a result of WWII this country was the sole leading capitalist state which not only had not incurred appreciable losses but, on the contrary, had emerged therefrom economically strengthened and enriched. It assumed the role of savior of capitalism. Hegemony in the capitalist world provided abundant new food for the messianic notions of the ruling circles of America, which was allegedly called upon to be the arbiter of the fate of mankind. Expansion was officially realized in the global strategy of "rolling back communism" and the arrangement of the world "American-style".

Globalism as a foreign policy doctrine is a version of geopolitics. Back in the 19th century even American ruling circles adopted a geopolitical approach to international relations, in accordance with which the United States' foreign policy interests and assignments are determined primarily by geographical constants. But it was in globalism and neoglobalism that this approach found its most concentrated and, what is more, exaggerated expression for the whole world is declared the sphere of American imperialism's "vital interests".

The main line of the study in question is an analysis of "Atlantism" and its evolution. Brought to the fore in the period of the creation of NATO, the "Atlantic civilization," "Atlantic community" concept was presented as the ideological, virtually philosophical and historical substantiation of this imperialist bloc. However, as the authors show, "Atlantism" as interpreted by U.S. foreign policy strategists was inscribed in their geopolitical, global aims.

The book also pays considerable attention to the purposes of American ruling circles at the time of formation of the North Atlantic alliance. However Western political scientists may strive to portray NATO as a defensive organization, it has in fact from the moment it emerged been an exclusive military grouping aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. All the military-strategic principles and, correspondingly, foreign policy actions of the United States since WWII have been based on the use or threat of force. The whole world has been declared here the arena of the confrontation with socialism, reminiscences of which we observe in the neoglobal policy of the R. Reagan administration and

the ultraconservative circles behind it. Military strength has been and continues to be considered in America a principal instrument of foreign policy.

Examining the evolution of "Atlantism" under the conditions of the relaxation of international tension (end of the 1960's-first half of the 1970's), the authors show the normality of the emergence and deepening of cracks in the relations between the United States and the West European "power center" which had taken shape by this time, which entailed a reassessment of the content of the "Atlantism" concept and gave rise to differences in its interpretation by the transatlantic and West European participants in NATO. The exacerbation of contradictions within the Atlantic alliance prompted American foreign policy strategists to seek new concepts of relations with West Europe (H. Kissinger's "partnership," Z. Brzezinski's "trilateral cooperation"). But they did not produce the result which Washington was hoping for: equal partnership did not fit within the framework of American geopolitics, and a return to the situation of total U.S. hegemony was impossible as a consequence of the changed correlation of forces.

The analysis of the foreign policy strategy of the United States and its ideological substantiation in the 1980's should be seen as an undoubted success for the authors. It is shown graphically that U.S. ruling circles' return to avowedly global principles has affected relations with the allies also. Washington has in fact denied the leadership of West European countries the right to influence the military decisions which it adopts, including those pertaining to the fate of Europe itself. The detente process, which began given the active participation of many West European countries, including NATO members, was thwarted. A selfish economic and currency policy harming the West European partners was adopted in parallel. Thus the Washington administration has conducted an offensive against the interests of West Europe on all axes.

At the same time the book notes the class-conditioned concurrence of interests of the American and West European ruling circles. The assumption of office in a number of the most important imperialist states of rightwing conservative forces, which have in fact agreed to support the militarist policy of the United States, has also contributed to a strengthening of the community of their aggressive foreign policy tendencies. And this despite the fact that American imperialism, spurring international tension, is hoping to strengthen its own economic positions in the struggle against competitors. The growth of the unproductive military spending of the West European countries urged on by Washington, their active involvement in military adventures in the developing world, attempts to dictate to them the terms of trade relations with the socialist countries—all this is aimed, aside from the goals proclaimed by the White House, at weakening the allies economically.

A few critical observations. We would note primarily the unevenness of the narrative and the protracted nature of

a number of chapters (the second and third, for example). Describing the reasons which enabled the R. Reagan administration to "turn the screw," so to speak, on the Atlantic alliance, the authors mention merely factors pertaining to the United States (military superiority, a certain strengthening of economic positions and so forth). However, there were also factors pertaining to West Europe: the assumption of office in Great Britain and the FRG of forces closer in terms of their ideological and political positions to the American neoconservatives; the intensification of disagreements between West European countries; a certain reorientation of France's foreign policy; and so forth. We can hardly agree with the fact that in examining the crisis of the Bretton Woods system (pp 278-280) the authors have nothing to say about such an appreciable factor as the influence of the lessening of government intervention in the state of the currency markets, and in this connection, about the activity of the TNC.

And, finally, did the canvas of an analysis of the United States' military-strategic principles and practical policy in the arms control and disarmament sphere merit the insertion of the specifications of the arms (pp 287, 393)? In our view, no, since they rapidly become outdated.

An interesting and significant work, on the whole.

#### Footnote

\* I.B. Ponomareva, N.A. Smirnova, "Geopolitika imperializma SShA: atlanticheskoye napravleniye" [The Geopolitics of U.S. Imperialism: the Atlantic Axis], edited by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, Moscow, "Mysl", 1986, 493pp.

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#### Articles in MEMO Not Translated

18160005k Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87)

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#### Publication Data

18160005l Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 15 Dec 87)

[Text] English title: WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Russian title: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA

Editor: G.G. Diligenkiy (new editor-in-chief)

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda"

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: January 1988

Signed to press: 15 December 1987

Copies: 25,000

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

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**DATE FILMED**

6 June 1989